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Abstract 
Monitoring by long-term investors should reduce agency conflicts in firms’ labor investment 
choices. Consistent with this argument, we find that abnormal net hiring, measured as the 
absolute deviation from optimal net hiring predicted by economic fundamentals, decreases in 
the presence of institutional investors with longer investment horizons. Firms dominated by 
long-term shareholders reduce both over-investment (over-hiring and under-firing) and under-
investment (under-hiring) in employees. The monitoring role of long-term investors is stronger 
for firms facing higher labor adjustment costs both in absolute terms and relative to capital 
adjustment costs, and those for which human capital is regarded as more important. The effect 
is also more pronounced for firms that have stronger incentives and/or more opportunities to 
deviate from expected net hiring. We address endogeneity concerns by exploiting exogenous 
changes to long-term institutional ownership resulting from annual reconstitutions of the 
Russell indexes. 
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Recent research has underscored the importance of corporate employment decisions, 
particularly the need for firms to maintain optimal investment in employees (Pinnuck and 
Lillis, 2007; Falato and Liang, 2016; Ellul et al., 2018). Divergence from optimal labor 
investment is costly to a firm since it leads to over-capacity problems, and thus lower 
productivity, in the case of over-investment, or insufficient growth in the case of under-
investment (Williamson, 1963; Stein, 1989). These problems are likely to be more acute in 
modern firms since they are more human-capital intensive (Pfeffer, 1996; Zingales, 2000) and 
invest heavily in labor.1 Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that shareholders, and particularly 
institutional investors, appreciate the importance of labor investments. For example, a coalition 
of institutional investors with over $2.8 trillion under management recently petitioned the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to introduce rules requiring firms to enhance 
disclosure on their human capital management policies.2 Also, BlackRock publishes an annual 
report detailing its approach to engagement on human capital management, which lists 
voluntary and involuntary turnover as well as employee tenure as topics it covers when 
engaging with the management teams of firms in its portfolio.3 In this paper, we study whether 
monitoring, or even the threat of monitoring, by institutional investors, particularly those with 
long investment horizons, mitigates agency conflicts associated with employment decisions 
and thus reduces labor investment inefficiency. 
 
1 The Annual Survey of Manufacturers reports that payroll and employee benefits in the U.S. manufacturing sector 
totaled $828 billion in 2015, compared to $175 billion in capital expenditure. The survey is available at 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2015/econ/asm/2015-asm.html. 
2 On July 6 2017, the SEC received a petition for rulemaking (File No. 4-711) urging the adoption of standards 
requiring firms to disclose information on their human capital management policies, practices, and performance. 
The petition was submitted by the Human Capital Management Coalition, which is an initiative supported by 25 
influential institutional investors, including some of the largest pension funds. 




An important factor that should affect the willingness of an institutional investor to 
engage in monitoring is the time horizon of his/her investment. Institutional shareholders can 
vary in their investment horizons because of differences in their trading strategies and/or the 
maturities of their liabilities. Many hedge funds and open-ended mutual funds, for example, 
are short term as a result of their trading strategies and their high liquidity needs, whereas 
pension funds and insurance companies usually have long horizons because of the longer 
maturities of their liabilities (Yan and Zhang, 2009; Derrien et al., 2013). As in Gaspar et al. 
(2005) and Chen et al. (2007), we argue that long-term investors enjoy economies of scale in 
collecting and processing corporate information. These investors have lower monitoring cost 
functions since they build firm- and manager-specific knowledge over time. This knowledge 
helps them benefit from monitoring by increasing their ability to influence managers, as well 
as enhancing the quality of the information they collect, which could be used to inform future 
trading decisions (Chen et al., 2007). This argument is in line with McCahery et al.’s (2016) 
survey evidence on the importance of investment horizons in explaining institutional investors’ 
engagement with their portfolio firms. Therefore, we frame the underlying conflict under 
investigation as an agency problem between managers and long-term shareholders. 
Inefficiencies in human-capital investments can take the form of over- and/or under-
investment in labor. Over-investment in labor takes place when agency conflicts lead self-
interested managers to engage in over-hiring activities as part of their empire-building agendas. 
Williamson (1963) specifically uses the expansion of staff numbers beyond optimal levels as 
an example of managers’ opportunistic behavior aimed at gaining more security and power. 
Over-investment in labor also occurs when managers decide to retain (under-fire) poorly 
performing employees as a mutually beneficial arrangement. Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2003) show that managers may be reluctant to trim an unproductive workforce because of 
their preference for the quiet life and their desire to avoid the difficult decisions and costly 
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effort associated with downsizing. Pagano and Volpin (2005) demonstrate that top managers 
facing potential dismissal for poor performance may form an alliance with the workforce by 
abstaining from worker layoffs and wage cuts. Workers, in return, may help retain such 
managers if they have sufficient power to affect such decisions. Similarly, Atanassov and Kim 
(2009) show that weak investor protection combined with strong union laws leads to worker-
management alliances, in which poorly performing firms sell assets to prevent large-scale 
layoffs, garnering worker support for retaining the management. Landier et al. (2009) find that 
firms in the U.S. are less likely to lay off workers located geographically closer to the corporate 
headquarters, and that this behavior may, in part, reflect private benefits to CEOs that come 
from interacting with workers and communities close to the corporate headquarters. 
Under-investment in labor, on the other hand, occurs when pressure from outside 
investors leads managers to over-fire underperforming employees or to under-hire to meet 
earnings targets. As stressed by Narayanan (1985), Stein (1989), Froot et al. (1992), Porter 
(1992), and Von Thadden (1995), myopic pressures from outside investors can result in 
managers turning down valuable investment opportunities due to concerns over the firm’s 
short-term stock price. Therefore, a manager concerned with short-term results can end up 
under-investing in labor out of fear that such investments would depress earnings and adversely 
affect stock prices (Porter, 1992; Bushee, 1998). Empirical evidence produced by Graham et 
al. (2005) reports that a significant number of managers are willing to give up projects that will 
be profitable in the long run to meet short-run earnings targets. Of most relevance to our context 
is their finding that firms can postpone or eliminate hiring to avoid missing earnings targets. 
Motivated by the abundant evidence on the agency conflicts associated with labor 
investments, we argue that the existence of long-term institutional investors in a firm’s 
ownership structure can help mitigate these conflicts. We hypothesize that, in firms with longer 
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investor horizons, direct monitoring or the threat of monitoring by long-term investors should 
result in fewer sub-optimal investments in employees. 
To capture the investment horizon of a firm’s shareholders, we follow the literature 
(Gaspar et al., 2005; Yan and Zhang, 2009; Cella et al., 2013) and measure the investment 
horizon of each institutional shareholder using his/her portfolio turnover level. We then 
aggregate individual turnover rates within each firm to get the (weighted) average portfolio 
turnover rate of all institutional investors with positive shareholdings in the firm. To ensure 
that higher values of our horizon proxy correspond to a longer investment horizon and to 
simplify the interpretation of our results, we multiply the investor turnover measure by -1. We 
call this proxy Investor_Stability and use it in subsequent analysis to study how the investment 
horizon of a firm’s institutional shareholders affects the efficiency of its labor investments.  
Based on the economics literature (e.g., Hamermesh, 1989) and recent empirical studies 
in accounting and finance (e.g., Pinnuck and Lillis, 2007; Ellul et al., 2018; Benmelech et al., 
2019), we use firms’ net hiring (i.e., the percentage change in the number of employees) to 
proxy for their investment in labor. We measure investment inefficiencies as the absolute 
deviation of actual net hiring from its expected (optimal) level, predicted by economic 
fundamentals. Our measure thus captures firms’ abnormal net hiring, that is, the amount of net 
hiring not attributable to those underlying economic factors. We note that our approach to 
measuring investment (in)efficiency is widely used in the capital investment literature (e.g., 
Richardson, 2006; Biddle et al., 2009; Cheng et al., 2013; García Lara et al., 2016; Stoughton 
et al., 2016). Importantly, our approach also follows recent papers that particularly focus on 
labor investment inefficiencies (Jung et al., 2014; Ben-Nasr and Alshwer, 2016).  
For our main analysis, we rely on the labor demand model of Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) 
to estimate a firm’s expected level of net hiring. Their model specification is similar to those 
used in several recent studies (e.g., Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Falato and Liang, 2016; Giroud 
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and Mueller, 2017; Ellul et al., 2018; Benmelech et al., 2019) but has the advantage of using a 
more comprehensive list of firm-level variables to explain normal hiring practices. 
Nevertheless, in our robustness tests, we consider several modifications to this model, for 
instance, by controlling for factors related to the supply of labor and frictions in local labor 
markets that may affect firms’ investment in employees. We further estimate expected net 
hiring using a firm’s average investment in the previous three years (Titman et al., 2004; Cella, 
2014) and median investment in the firm’s industry (Harvey et al., 2004; Cella, 2014). Our 
findings are robust to the use of these alternative proxies and hence do not depend on the use 
of the Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) labor demand model. 
To test our predictions, we use a sample of 51,414 firm-year observations from 1982 to 
2015. We find strong evidence that the presence of institutional investors with longer 
investment horizons is associated with significantly lower inefficiencies in labor investments. 
In particular, the impact of investor portfolio stability on abnormal net hiring is economically 
significant: a one standard deviation increase in Investor_Stability (0.059), which corresponds 
to an increase in investment horizon of 6.6 months, is associated with a reduction in abnormal 
net hiring of 8.9% relative to the median. This result holds across a variety of model 
specifications, different measures of expected net hiring, and is robust to controlling for known 
factors that might affect the efficiency of employment decisions. 
Next, we provide evidence on the interaction between Investor_Stability and different 
types of inefficiencies in labor investments. Specifically, we investigate over-investment (over-
hiring and under-firing) and under-investment (under-hiring and over-firing) problems and find 
that, except for over-firing, each form of inefficiency is mitigated by the presence of long-term 
investors. Moreover, we show that the impact of Investor_Stability on abnormal net hiring is 
more pronounced for firms that face higher labor adjustment costs (LACs). It is also stronger 
for firms with high LACs relative to capital adjustment costs (CACs) or those that attach more 
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importance to their labor force. These findings are consistent with the notion that long-term 
investors play a stronger monitoring role when deviation from optimal labor demand is more 
costly to the firm or when human capital is more important to its business model. 
We run further cross-sectional tests to study the types of firms that are more likely to 
engage in abnormal net hiring and thus require more monitoring by long-term investors. We 
contend that the monitoring role of long-term investors is most relevant for firms that have 
stronger incentives and/or greater opportunities to deviate from expected net hiring. In line 
with our predictions, we find that the role of long-term investors in reducing labor investment 
inefficiencies is more important for complex firms and firms with weak governance and/or low 
financial reporting quality. These firms have greater agency conflicts and information 
asymmetry, giving management more opportunities to deviate from optimal investment policy 
and hence requiring more attention from long-term investors. We also find the impact of 
Investor_Stability on labor investment inefficiency to be more pronounced for companies with 
shorter-maturity debt, male or older CEOs, and different levels of managerial ownership, which 
may arguably suffer from greater agency conflicts. 
A major concern with a causal interpretation of our findings is self-selection. The 
coefficient on Investor_Stability may be biased if long-term investors select firms that are more 
efficient in their labor investments. Omitted variable bias poses yet another concern. A firm’s 
ownership structure may be related to unobservable factors that also affect its labor 
investments, leading to a spurious correlation. We address those concerns in four ways. First, 
we mitigate the omitted variable bias by controlling for a host of corporate governance 
variables, other non-labor investments, and alternative explanations that may be related to 
investor horizons. Second, we perform propensity score matching (hereafter, PSM) to alleviate 
the possibility that our results are driven by observable confounding effects. The PSM analysis 
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shows that, in line with our baseline finding, the abnormal net hiring of firms with high 
Investor_Stability is significantly lower than that of matched firms with low Investor_Stability. 
Third, following Derrien et al. (2013) and Nguyen et al. (2020), we split long-term 
investors into non-indexers and indexers. Using Bushee’s (1998) institutional investor 
classifications, we show that our results are similar for both (potentially endogenous) non-
indexers and (reasonably exogenous) indexers. The latter are passive investors that are widely 
diversified and do not trade much; that is, they cannot freely discard firms’ stocks as they must 
replicate an index. For this reason, they are more likely to influence the firms in which they 
invest through “voice”. As Derrien et al. (2013) and Appel et al. (2016) describe, indexers 
cannot be active investors but have an incentive to be activist investors. The fact that our results 
hold for long-term indexers mitigates the potential concern that long-term investors self-select 
to invest in firms with more efficient investments in employees. 
Fourth, and importantly, we adopt an instrumental variable (hereafter, IV) approach 
where we exploit the plausibly exogenous variation in the holdings of quasi-indexer investors 
as a result of the annual reconstitutions of the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes. Following 
Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017), we track firms that switched from one index to the other in 
a particular year, focusing on changes in index assignment for firms ranked close to the Russell 
1000/2000 threshold. Given that these indexes are value-weighted and quasi-indexer investors 
have to apply the index weights in their portfolios to mimic their benchmark index and 
minimize their tracking error, the (random) changes in index assignment for firms around the 
threshold lead to significant changes in quasi-indexer ownership levels. Using two-stage least 
squares (hereafter, 2SLS) estimations, we show that exogenous increases in long-term 
ownership are associated with reductions in labor investment inefficiency, which is consistent 
with our main finding. Taken together, while it is difficult to rule out endogeneity concerns, 
our tests consistently point to a causal effect of long-term ownership on labor investment 
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efficiency. Still, we acknowledge that our study only provides indirect evidence on the channel 
driving this result, namely, monitoring by long-term institutional investors. 
The main contribution of our study is that we document novel evidence of the role of 
institutional investors in mitigating incentive problems associated with labor investments. 
Recent evidence suggests that the presence of long-term investors can help reduce the agency 
conflicts associated with investments in capital (Cella, 2014), research and development 
(Bushee, 1998; Aghion et al., 2013; Harford et al., 2018), acquisitions (Gaspar et al., 2005; 
Chen et al., 2007), and corporate social responsibility (Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; Nguyen et 
al., 2020). However, existing results regarding the impact of investor horizons on firms’ non-
labor investments cannot be generalized to an analysis of labor investments primarily due to 
differences in their adjustment costs. The classical view of labor typically considers it a variable 
production factor that has limited adjustment costs, which can be paid out from firm revenues 
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The reason is that, relative to capital expenditures, the timing of 
labor investments better matches with that of current-year revenues, meaning that labor costs 
can be covered by operating cash flows (Jung et al., 2014; Khedmati et al., 2019). To the extent 
that labor is a variable production factor, it has limited market frictions and can be adjusted at 
a very low cost. Accordingly, one could argue that even when firms deviate from optimal net 
hiring, they can easily revert to the optimal level. In the absence of labor market frictions, labor 
adjustment requires little, if any, monitoring effort by long-term institutional investors. 
Combining this argument with our main hypothesis suggests that the question of whether long-
term investors play a role in shaping firms’ employment decisions is an empirical one. 
Even in the presence of labor market frictions (e.g., Dube et al., 2010),4 the cost of 
adjusting labor appears to be lower than the cost of adjusting non-labor investment (e.g., 
 
4 Labor has increasingly been subject to more (labor) market regulations, which increase the LACs (Matsa, 2018). 




Bloom, 2009). Since the magnitude of factor adjustment costs directly determines how firms 
make investment decisions, the effect of long-term institutional investors on labor investment 
should differ from that on capital investment. This effect could be more pronounced for labor 
investment if firms facing relatively higher CACs already maintain capital investment close to 
its optimal level and thus require relatively less monitoring for capital expenditure. However, 
when CACs are relatively higher than LACs, long-term investors may have a stronger incentive 
to monitor capital than labor investment because deviations from the optimal level of capital 
investment are relatively more costly to the firm. Our arguments are based on the premise that 
long-term institutional investors may have to carefully consider where to focus their monitoring 
effort, i.e., on labor or capital investments, since monitoring costs could be significant (Gaspar 
et al., 2005), and investors have finite monitoring resources. Overall, these arguments lead to 
alternative views and suggest that the effect of long-term institutional investors on corporate 
investment in employees is an open empirical question that warrants further research.  
In sum, it is important to examine whether and to what extent long-term investors 
reduce inefficient investments in labor. Our study fills this gap in the literature by providing 
the first evidence that the presence of long-term investors is associated with improvements in 
corporate decisions relating to investments in labor. Our robustness checks also suggest that 
this effect is incremental to the impacts of investor horizons on other non-labor investments 
that may be correlated with investments in employees. As mentioned above, we further find 
that this effect is more pronounced for firms with higher LACs relative to CACs. This latter 
finding highlights the differences between labor and non-labor investments in terms of their 
adjustment costs, thus showing the importance of investigating the former type of investment.  
 
wrongful termination practices. These frictions in the labor market could affect the impact of long-term ownership 
on abnormal net hiring, either by strengthening the incentives of long-term owners to monitor managerial actions 
or by reducing managers’ incentives to deviate from optimal employment levels. 
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We also contribute to a broader line of research that investigates the impact of investor 
horizons on corporate outcomes, including the cost of capital (Elyasiani et al., 2010; Attig et 
al., 2013, Huang and Petkevic, 2016), the potential for financial misreporting (Burns et al., 
2010), the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flows (Attig et al., 2012), the tradeoff 
between dividends and share repurchases (Gaspar et al., 2013), seasoned equity offerings (Hao, 
2014), and CEO turnover-performance sensitivity (Gao et al., 2017).5 In robustness checks, we 
show that our main finding holds after controlling for many of these factors. 
Our study also relates to a growing body of literature on the interactions between labor 
and corporate policies in the presence of incentive problems and various governance 
mechanisms. As reviewed above, this literature has examined managers’ downsizing decisions 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Perry and Shivdasani, 2005), their incentives to collude 
with workers for mutual protection (Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Atanassov and Kim, 2009), their 
preference for maintaining strong ties with employees, increasing worker wages, and avoiding 
lay-offs (Cronqvist et al., 2009; Landier et al., 2009), as well as their incentives to under-invest 
in labor (Graham et al., 2005). We show that the existence of institutional investors with longer 
investment horizons in a firm’s ownership structure can mitigate the incentive problems 
associated with the firm’s employment decisions. 
Finally, our paper is closely related to three recent studies by Jung et al. (2014), Ben-
Nasr and Alshwer (2016), and Khedmati et al. (2019) that also consider the implications of 
agency conflicts for labor investments. However, the focus of those studies is different from 
ours, as they examine financial reporting quality, stock price informativeness, and absence of 
CEO-director ties. Our results suggest that investor horizons, as an external governance 
mechanism, can also help to reduce these inefficiencies. 
 
5 Our paper is also related to a broader literature examining other motives of institutional investors to engage in 
monitoring (e.g., Fich et al., 2015; Ward et al., 2018).  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
research design. Section 3 reports and discusses the main empirical results. Section 4 presents 
several robustness tests whereas Section 5 addresses endogeneity concerns. Section 6 examines 
the role of short-term investors, and Section 7 draws conclusions. 
2. Data and research design 
2.1 Sample and data sources 
We begin with all firms in Compustat between 1982 and 2015. We then exclude firms 
with missing data for the main variables used in our regressions. Consistent with the extant 
literature, we exclude financial firms and utilities (SIC codes between 6,000 and 6,999 or 4,900 
and 4,999).6 We obtain data on the portfolio holdings of institutional investors from the 
Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) database, which provides institutional common 
stock holdings and transactions, as reported on Form 13F that is filed with the SEC. This data 
set contains ownership information on common stock positions (of more than 10,000 shares or 
$200,000 in value) by institutional managers with $100 million or more in equity securities 
under discretionary management. Information on firms’ net hiring and financial characteristics 
is obtained from Compustat.7 Data on stock returns come from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP). To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorize all Compustat variables 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their distributions. The final sample consists of 51,414 firm-
year observations representing 6,313 unique firms over the period 1982 to 2015. 
 
6 We exclude financial firms and utilities because these firms are heavily regulated, and their financing and 
investment policies may be quite different from those of other firms. For instance, prior studies argue that 
managers of regulated firms often have less discretion over future investment decisions than those of unregulated 
firms (e.g., Smith, 1986; Barclay and Smith, 1995). 
7 The Compustat variable reporting the number of employees (emp) contains missing values due to the fact that 
firms may choose whether or not to report these data. Nevertheless, in our sample of Compustat firms matched 
with the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) database, emp is available for almost 97% of the firm-
year observations, indicating that sample selection is not a concern. 
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2.2 Investment horizon measures 
To measure the investment horizon of a firm’s institutional investors based on the 
turnover rate, we proceed as follows. Using data on the portfolio holdings of institutional 
investors from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) database, and following the 
extant literature (Gaspar et al., 2005; Yan and Zhang, 2009; Cella et al., 2013; Huang and 
Petkevic, 2016, Hovakimian and Hu, 2016), we compute each institutional shareholder’s 
investment horizon by looking at the quarterly turnover level of their portfolio; that is, the ratio 
of dollar share purchases and sales during a quarter to the total dollar value of the portfolio. 
The logic behind this measure is that investors will be classified as long term if they churn their 
overall portfolio less frequently. Derrien et al. (2013) demonstrate the validity of the portfolio 
turnover measure as a proxy for the investment horizon by showing that the measure is 
persistent over time; that is, that the investor horizon is a characteristic of investors, and that 
the measure is accurate in classifying investors known to be long term, such as Warren Buffett 
(Berkshire Hathaway), CalPERS, and the Vanguard Group, and those known to be short term, 
such as György Soros (Soros Fund Management) and Stevie Cohen (SAC Capital 
Management). The turnover rate of institutional investor i in quarter q is calculated as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑞 =








                 (1)  
 
where TRi,q is the turnover rate of investor i in quarter q, Qq is the set of companies held by 
investor i in quarter q, Nk,i,q is the number of shares of company k held by investor i in quarter 
q, and Pk,q is the share price of firm k in quarter q. By construction, the range of the turnover 
rate is the interval [0, 2]. To provide a more stable and accurate classification of an investor’s 
horizon, we then calculate the average turnover level of his/her portfolio over the previous four 
quarters as follows:     
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                                           (2) 
Using the investor-level turnover rate (Avg_TRi,q), we then calculate the firm-level 
turnover rate as the weighted average of the turnover rates of all institutional investors in a 
firm’s ownership structure: 
𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑘,𝑞 =   ∑ 𝑤𝑘,𝑖,𝑞 𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑞
𝑖∈𝑆𝑘,𝑞
                  (3) 
where wk,i,q is the weight of investor i in the total percentage held by institutional investors in 
company k at quarter q, and Sk,q is the set of institutional investors in company k at quarter q. 
Finally, to ensure that higher values of our horizon proxy correspond to a longer investment 
horizon and to simplify the interpretation of our results, we multiply the investor turnover 
measure by -1. We use this proxy, which we call Investor_Stability, to study how the 
investment horizon of a firm’s institutional shareholders affects the efficiency of its labor 
investments. In addition to this main proxy (Investor_Stability), in Section 5.2 we use 
alternative measures of long-term investor horizons based on Bushee’s (1998, 2001) 
institutional investor classifications.8 
2.3 Measure of labor investment efficiency 
Following Pinnuck and Lillis (2007), Ellul et al. (2018), and Benmelech et al. (2019), 
we use firms’ net hiring, measured as the percentage change in the number of employees 
between year t-1 and year t, to proxy for investment in employees. We then employ the standard 
approach in the capital and labor investment literatures (e.g., Richardson, 2006; Biddle et al., 
2009; Cheng et al., 2013; Jung et al., 2014; Ben-Nasr and Alshwer, 2016; García Lara et al., 
2016; Stoughton et al., 2016), and measure labor investment inefficiencies 
 




(Abnormal_Net_Hiring) as the absolute deviation of actual net hiring from its expected level 
predicted by economic fundamentals:  
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 =  |𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔|      (4) 
Our main approach to estimating a firm’s expected level of net hiring is well-grounded 
in prior research in economics, accounting, and finance. In the labor economics literature, 
Hamermesh (1989) derives a simple model of long-run equilibrium labor demand, which 
maximizes firm value.9 Subsequent studies then employ a reduced-form labor demand model, 
often augmented by including a number of firm characteristics. We follow this strand of 
research and use the labor demand model of Pinnuck and Lillis (2007), which also resembles 
the employment models estimated in recent studies (e.g., Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Falato and 
Liang, 2016; Giroud and Mueller, 2017; Ellul et al., 2018). However, while the latter models 
typically include a limited number of explanatory variables, the Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) 
model uses an extensive list of firm-specific variables to explain normal hiring practices. 
Formally, the model takes the following form: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5∆𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9∆𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10∆𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ ∑ 𝛿𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡
1𝑡𝑜5 + 𝜆𝑗 + 𝑖,𝑡
5
𝐿=1
                                                                     (5) 
where the subscripts i and t refer to firm i and year t, respectively. Net_Hiring is the percentage 
change in the number of employees, Sales_Growth is the percentage change in sales revenue, 
Profit is net income scaled by beginning-of-year total assets, ∆Profit represents the change in 
net income scaled by beginning-of-year total assets, Return is the total annual stock return, Size 
is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s book value of assets, Quick_Ratio is the ratio 
 
9 See also Bond and Van Reenen (2007) for a comprehensive review of factor demand models. 
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of cash and short-term investments plus receivables to current liabilities, Leverage is measured 
as long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, scaled by the book value of assets, and 
Loss_Bins are five dummy variables indicating each interval of profitability of length 0.005 
from 0 to -0.025. For example, Loss_Bin1 takes the value of one if Profit is between -0.005 
and 0, and zero otherwise, and so on for the other Loss_Bins; see Appendix A for detailed 
variable definitions. The model also includes industry fixed effects (λj) to control for 
unobserved industry characteristics affecting net hiring. 
In Appendix B, we present the regression results for the labor demand model, Eq. (5). 
We find that sales growth, profitability, stock returns, size, and corporate liquidity have a 
positive and significant impact on net hiring. Leverage and the loss bins, on the other hand, are 
negatively associated with net hiring. These results are consistent with Pinnuck and Lillis 
(2007) and prior theoretical predictions, suggesting that the labor demand model is well 
estimated. We note that the fitted value from the model is the estimate of a firm’s 
Expected_Net_Hiring, while the absolute value of the unexplained portion (or residual) 
becomes our estimate of a firm’s Abnormal_Net_Hiring. To confirm the validity of our 
measure of sub-optimal net hiring, we show in our Internet Appendix (Section 1 and Table 
IA.1) that this measure has a significant and negative impact on future firm market value and 
operating performance, which is consistent with our conjectures.  
2.4 Empirical specification and control variables 
To explore the interaction between institutional investment horizons and labor 
investment efficiency, we examine the effect of Investor_Stability on Abnormal_Net_Hiring. 
Specifically, we estimate the following baseline model: 
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝑁𝑒𝑡_𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑗 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 (6)    
 
where Investor_Stability and Abnormal_Net_Hiring are defined as in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, 
respectively. The vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 includes control variables that, based on previous literature (e.g., 
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Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Richardson, 2006; Biddle et al., 2009), are likely to be associated 
with a firm’s investment efficiency. In particular, as in Jung et al. (2014) and Ben-Nasr and 
Alshwer (2016) we control for investment opportunities, size, corporate liquidity, dividend 
payouts, cash flow and sales volatilities, tangibility, any incidence of losses, net hiring 
volatility, labor intensity, and institutional ownership. We also include a proxy for 
inefficiencies associated with non-labor investments (capital expenditure, R&D expenditure, 
and acquisitions) to control for any indirect effect on Abnormal_Net_Hiring from other 
investment decisions. We further account for time-invariant industry heterogeneity and time 
trends by including a vector of industry fixed effects and time dummies (λj and ηt).
10 Note that 
in our robustness tests (Section 4.3), we also control for a number of other variables. Appendix 
A provides detailed variable definitions.  
2.5 Summary statistics and univariate test 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the labor investment, ownership, and control 
variables used in our main analysis.11 The average and median values of our dependent 
variable, Abnormal_Net_Hiring, are 0.123 and 0.070, respectively; this means that actual net 
hiring deviates on average from expected net hiring by 12.3 percentage points. These figures 
are in line with Jung et al. (2014), who report mean and median Abnormal_Net_Hiring values 
of 0.113 and 0.070, respectively. Institutional investors own, on average, 43.4% of firms’ 
 
10 As mentioned in Section 2.2, investor horizon is a persistent investor characteristic. It follows that most of the 
investor horizon variation comes from the cross-section not the time-series. Hence, we refrain from including firm 
fixed effects because little is gained by focusing on limited within firm variation; this modelling choice is common 
in research using a similar investor horizon measure (Gaspar et al., 2005; Gaspar et al., 2013; Harford et al., 2018). 
In robustness tests, we control for unobservable heterogeneity using a series of state, industry, and year fixed 
effects as well as their interactions. We present a formal identification strategy in Section 5. 
11 The descriptive statistics for the variables in Eq. (5) are similar to those reported in prior studies. For example, 
the average expected annual percentage change in the number of employees (Expected_Net_Hiring) is 5%, which 




equity. There is a clear time trend, with institutional ownership increasing substantially over 
the last 20 years (untabulated result). The average investor turnover (Inv_Turnover) is 0.191, 
which means that institutional investors hold an average stock in their portfolio for around 31.4 
months.12 Dedicated institutional investors hold, on average, 5.5% of their portfolio firms’ 
shares, as compared to the 30.3% held by quasi-indexer investors.  
We next conduct a univariate analysis in which we compare Abnormal_Net_Hiring for 
firms with above- and below-median Investor_Stability (untabulated). Our comparison reveals 
that firms with above-median Investor_Stability display significantly lower 
Abnormal_Net_Hiring than firms with below-median Investor_Stability. Specifically, the 
average (median) value of Abnormal_Net_Hiring is 11.4% (6.6%) for firms with above-median 
Investor_Stability, compared to a value of 13.2% (7.4%) for firms with below-median 
Investor_Stability. The difference of 1.8 (0.8) percentage points is statistically significant at the 
1% level, and is economically significant as it amounts to around 15% (11%) of the average 
(median) value of Abnormal_Net_Hiring. This preliminary finding suggests that more stable 
ownership by institutional investors is associated with fewer sub-optimal employment 
decisions, consistent with our main hypothesis.  
3. Empirical results 
3.1 Investment horizons and labor investment efficiency: Main findings 
Table 2 presents the regression results on the relation between long-term investors and 
abnormal net hiring. We report t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, 
clustered at the firm level. Models 1−3 include industry and year dummies. In Model 1, we 
 
12 Recalling that Inv_Turnover takes values in the interval [0, 2], an average Inv_Turnover of 0.191 means that 
0.191/2 =9.55% of the portfolio is turned over in a given quarter. This corresponds to 38.2% of the position being 
turned over in a given year, which implies that institutional investors hold an average stock in their portfolio for 
around 12/0.382 = 31.4 months. There is a clear time trend in Inv_Turnover; that is, Inv_Turnover has increased 
in recent years (untabulated result). 
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exclude Investor_Stability and regress Abnormal_Net_Hiring on the control variables. Firms 
with higher institutional ownership stakes, of a bigger size, with less liquidity, lower debt, 
positive dividend payouts, more tangible assets, and higher labor intensity tend to exhibit lower 
inefficiencies in their investments in employees. At the same time, Abnormal_Net_Hiring is 
positively related to a higher incidence of losses, abnormal non-labor investments,13 and the 
volatilities of cash flow, sales, and past net hiring. These results are broadly consistent with 
previous evidence in the literature (e.g., Jung et al., 2014; Ben-Nasr and Alshwer, 2016).  
Model 2 is identical to Model 1 except that Investor_Stability, our main variable of 
interest, is introduced as an additional explanatory variable. In line with our main hypothesis, 
we find that the coefficient estimate for Investor_Stability is negative and highly significant, 
suggesting that a more stable institutional ownership structure helps improve the efficiency of 
a firm’s labor investments.14 The impact of investor portfolio stability on abnormal net hiring 
is also economically significant: a one standard deviation increase in Investor_Stability (0.059), 
which corresponds to an increase in the investment horizon of 6.6 months, is associated with a 
reduction in Abnormal_Net_Hiring of 8.9% relative to the median.15  
In the last two models, we evaluate the robustness of our results to controlling for other 
sources of unobserved heterogeneity. Model 3 repeats the analysis of Model 2 but also adds 
state-level fixed effects. Including state fixed effects allows us to account for persistent 
differences across states in characteristics that could affect the investment horizon and labor 
 
13 Abnormal non-labor investment is the only variable in our model that is not lagged, and hence demonstrates 
significant explanatory power with a large t-statistic of about 27. Our results are robust to excluding this variable 
or taking its lagged value, in which case the t-statistic drops to approximately 12. 
14 Since investor turnover and stability may be associated with firm-level volatility and uncertainty, in 
(untabulated) tests, we further control for stock return volatility, firm-level uncertainty (Alfaro et al., 2019), and 
firm-level political risk (Hassan et al., 2019). Our results remain unchanged. 
15 We obtain qualitatively similar results if we instead define long-term ownership as the firm’s percentage 
ownership held by investors in the bottom 33rd percentile of the average turnover rate (Avg_TRi,q). 
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investment relation; for example, geographic differences, which affect the relocation decisions 
of highly educated populations (Moretti, 2011), or differences in labor laws such as WDLs that 
are time-invariant during our sample period and affect the labor demand function (e.g., 
Serfling, 2016). In Model 4, instead of controlling for industry, year, and state fixed effects 
separately like we do in Model 3, we include industry-year and state-year fixed effects to 
control for time-varying heterogeneity across industries and time-varying differences in local 
economic environments (Gormley and Matsa, 2014). The sign and magnitude of the coefficient 
on Investor_Stability in Models 3 and 4 is comparable to that of Model 2.  
 Overall, our findings are qualitatively similar across a variety of model specifications; 
that is, institutional ownership stability has a robust and negative impact on abnormal net hiring 
practices.16 This evidence is consistent with our main hypothesis that the investment horizon 
of a firm’s institutional shareholders increases the efficiency of its labor investments. 
3.2 Investment horizons and specific types of labor investment inefficiency  
In this section, we provide evidence on the interaction between institutional investment 
horizons and specific forms of labor investment inefficiencies. Specifically, we investigate 
whether long-term institutional ownership mitigates over- and/or under-investment in labor. 
There is no a priori reason to anticipate an asymmetric effect on those two forms of investment 
inefficiencies. Hence, we expect the presence of long-term investors to be associated with 
lower inefficiencies in both over- and under-investment. We define over-investing firms as 
those with positive abnormal net hiring (i.e., Actual_Net_Hiring greater than 
Expected_Net_Hiring) and under-investing firms as those with negative abnormal net hiring 
(i.e., Actual_Net_Hiring less than Expected_Net_Hiring). We estimate Eq. (6) for these 
subsamples of over- and under-investing firms and report the results in Table 3. 
 
16 We note that across all specifications the adjusted R2 is at 15%, which indicates a goodness-of-fit comparable 
to that reported by studies using similar specifications (e.g., Jung et al., 2014; Benmelech et al., 2015). 
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Panel A of Table 3 presents the results on the relation between investor stability and 
over-investment. As in our baseline regressions in Table 2, we include the controls, year, and 
industry fixed effects. In Models 2, 4, and 6, we further control for state fixed effects. In Models 
1−2, we find that Investor_Stability reduces Abnormal_Net_Hiring for over-investing firms. In 
Models 3–6, we further decompose over-investment into over-hiring and under-firing based on 
whether a firm’s labor force is expected to grow or diminish according to economic 
fundamentals. Specifically, a firm over-hires (under-fires) if it over-invests when its expected 
level of net hiring is positive (negative). We find that each form of over-investment is mitigated 
by the presence of long-term investors. 
In Panel B of Table 3, we report the results on the effect of investor stability on under-
investment. We use the same model specifications as in Panel A. In Models 1−2, we find that 
Investor_Stability reduces the deviation between actual and expected net hiring for under-
investing firms. In Models 3–6, we further break down under-investment into under-hiring and 
over-firing. A firm under-hires (over-fires) if it under-invests when its expected level of net 
hiring is positive (negative). We find that under-hiring is mitigated by the presence of long-
term investors; however, in Models 5−6, the results for over-firing become insignificant. In 
summary, we find that most specific forms of labor investment inefficiency are mitigated by 
the presence of long-term investors.  
3.3 The role of labor and labor adjustment costs 
3.3.1 Labor adjustment costs 
To better explain the investor incentives for the observed negative relation between 
investor horizons and labor investment inefficiencies, we examine whether the impact of 
Investor_Stability on Abnormal_Net_Hiring varies with the level of LACs. Earlier studies 
document the presence of economically significant costs associated with firms’ labor 
adjustments. These costs include the costs of firing (severance pay and lawsuits), searching 
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(recruitment agency fees and advertising), selection and hiring (application screening and 
interviews), training, and costs due to productivity losses (peer and supervisor disruption).17  
There are two alternative views regarding the impact of LACs on the relationship 
between investor horizons and labor investment efficiencies. First, since firms cannot adjust 
their labor demand in a costless way, they should keep labor turnover stable and minimize 
deviations from the optimal labor demand policy implied by economic fundamentals (Dixit, 
1997). This view implies that long-term investors have a stronger incentive to monitor the 
employment activities of the firm when it faces higher LACs, because deviations from the 
optimal labor demand policy are more costly to the firm. Hence, the impact of investor stability 
on abnormal net hiring should be stronger for firms with high LACs than those with low LACs. 
An alternative argument is that firms faced with high LACs already have an incentive to reduce 
abnormal net hiring, in which case they would require less monitoring by long-term investors. 
This argument predicts that the effect of investor stability on abnormal net hiring is less 
pronounced for firms with high LACs than those with low LACs. We note, however, that this 
argument is based on a restrictive assumption that there is no agency conflict between 
management and shareholders. Under the more realistic assumption that incentive problems 
exist, the presence of high LACs, by itself, does not necessarily deter self-interested, utility-
maximizing managers from making inefficient labor investments. 
To proxy for LACs, we use two recently proposed measures in the literature: (a) the 
state-level passage of WDLs and (b) firms’ reliance on skilled labor. First, as in Serfling (2016), 
we exploit an exogenous variation in firing costs, a major component of LACs, following the 
 
17 Using survey data, the hiring costs per person are estimated at $2,000 for blue collar and manual labor workers 




state-level recognition of WDLs since the 1970s.18 We use WDL to measure the strength of 
WDLs in a state; WDL is constructed by summing three distinct dummy variables for each of 
the three WDLs exceptions. Second, since firms with a high share of skilled workers face higher 
LACs (Oi, 1962; Pfann and Palm, 1993; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Hamermesh and 
Pfann, 1996; Dixit, 1997), we adopt labor skills as another measure of LACs. Specifically, we 
follow Belo et al. (2017) and Ghaly et al. (2017), and use Occupational Employment Statistics 
(OES) data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. Department of Labor’s O*NET 
program classification of occupations according to skill level, to construct an industry-specific 
index, Labor_Skill, that proxies for the LACs faced by the average firm in that industry.19  
Table 4 shows how the impact of firms’ Investor_Stability on Abnormal_Net_Hiring 
varies, conditional on WDL and Labor_Skill. In Panel A, we partition our sample firms into 
those headquartered in states that have recognized all three WDLs exceptions (i.e., firms with 
a WDL score of 3 and thus higher LACs) and those headquartered in states that have not 
adopted any of the exceptions (i.e., firms with a WDL score of 0 and thus lower LACs). Models 
1 and 2 report the results for the whole sample, whereas Models 3−4 and 5−6 show the results 
for firms with over- and under-investment problems. The results indicate that the impact of 
Investor_Stability on Abnormal_Net_Hiring is significant only for firms with higher LACs. In 
particular, for the whole sample, the coefficient on Investor_Stability is approximately four 
times bigger for firms with high LACs (-0.248) than for firms with low LACs (-0.060); the 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Models 3−4 and 5−6 reveal broadly similar 
 
18 WDLs include three common-law exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, which make it more costly 
and difficult for firms to dismiss workers. These exceptions include the public policy exception, the implied 
contract exception, and the good faith exception. A state can choose to adopt none to all of these exceptions (see 
Autor et al. (2006) for a detailed description of these laws).  
19 The O*NET occupational classifications are based on how much education, related work experience, and 




patterns when we examine the impact of Investor_Stability on over- and under-investment 
problems separately. In Panel B, we define firms in the top (bottom) 30th percentile of 
Labor_Skill as high- (low-) skill firms, which face high (low) LACs.20 The results continue to 
show that the impact of Investor_Stability on Abnormal_Net_Hiring is significant only for 
high-LACs firms; the only exception is the result for under-investment in Models 5 and 6, 
where the coefficients are insignificant for both subsamples. In sum, our findings are broadly 
consistent with the view that long-term investors play a stronger monitoring role when the 
deviation from the optimal labor demand policy is more costly to the firm. 
3.3.2 Labor and capital adjustment costs 
The previous analysis provides evidence of cross-sectional variation in the relation 
between long-term investors and labor investment efficiency conditional on firms’ LACs. In 
this section, we further examine how this relation varies with the cost of adjusting labor 
investment relative to the cost of adjusting capital investment. A central objective of this 
analysis is to demonstrate that differences between labor and capital adjustment costs lead to 
differences in the magnitude of the impact of Investor_Stability on labor investment efficiency, 
thus showing that the findings of prior studies on non-labor investment do not readily apply to 
labor investments as well.  
The economics literature reports that one of the most important differences between 
labor and non-labor investments lies in their cost of adjustment (Matsa, 2018). While the cost 
of adjusting labor could be substantial, it frequently appears to be lower than the cost of 
adjusting non-labor investment. For example, CACs, which include installation costs, losses 
due to disruptions to production, and particularly the irreversibility of capital investment (Dixit 
 
20 Our results are qualitatively similar when we define firms with above- (below-) median Labor_Skill scores as 




and Pindyck, 1994), are also substantial, and are frequently larger in magnitude than LACs.21 
We argue that the magnitude of adjustment costs directly affects how firms adjust their factor 
demand and reduce investment inefficiency. Since LACs are generally lower than CACs, the 
impact of long-term institutional investors on labor investment should differ from that on 
capital investment. The effect of investor horizons could be weaker for capital investment and 
more pronounced for labor investment if firms faced with relatively higher CACs already have 
stronger incentives to maintain capital investment close to what is optimal and thus require 
relatively less monitoring by long-term investors. However, when CACs are relatively higher 
than LACs, deviations from the optimal level of capital investment are relatively more costly 
to the firm, giving long-term investors a stronger incentive to monitor capital investment than 
labor investment; this would imply that the monitoring role of long-term investors is more 
pronounced for capital than labor investment. Overall, these arguments lead to two opposing 
predictions for the effect of investor horizons on labor investment efficiency.  
The evidence presented in Section 3.3.1 indicates that long-horizon investors play a 
stronger role in monitoring corporate employment decisions in the presence of higher LACs, 
measured using the (state-level) passage of the WDLs or a labor skill index. This finding is 
consistent with the argument that in the presence of higher LACs, long-term investors exercise 
more monitoring to ensure that firms follow their optimal labor demand policy, thus avoiding 
high costs due to deviations from this policy. Using this line of reasoning, we thus predict that 
long-term investors have more incentive to monitor firms’ labor investment decisions for firms 
 
21 Bloom (2009), for instance, examines the impact of uncertainty shocks and shows that, on average, the estimated 
component of CACs due to investment irreversibility is 34% of capital while the fixed component represents 1.5% 
of annual revenue. In terms of LACs, Bloom’s estimates suggest that hiring and firing costs are about 1.8% of 
annual sales but the fixed cost component of LACs represents 2.1% of annual sales. See also previous estimates 
of LACs and CACs in Shapiro (1986), Hall (2004), and Merz and Yashiv (2007). 
25 
 
with higher LACs-to-CACs ratios. We note that when the ratio of LACs to CACs is high, 
adjusting labor becomes relatively more important to firms than adjusting capital. 
To test our prediction, in Table 5 we exploit the cross-sectional variation in LACs 
relative to CACs using proxies and estimates of those costs in recent research. In Panel A, we 
use firms’ reliance on skilled labor to proxy for LACs, as in Section 3.3.1. We then use firms’ 
asset redeployability to measure their CACs; this measure reflects the extent to which assets 
have alternative uses within and across industries (Kim and Kung, 2017; Campello et al., 2018). 
In Panel B of Table 5, we proxy for LACs and CACs using the industry estimates from Hall 
(2004); these estimates are based on the Euler equations for factor demand. We then estimate 
our model for firms with above- (below-) median LACs-to-CACs ratios.22  
Panel A of Table 5 shows that the impact of long-term investors on labor investment 
inefficiency, and its two specific forms, over-investment and under-investment, is significant 
and negative, consistent with our baseline finding. Importantly, the impact of long-term 
investors is economically more pronounced when the LACs-to-CACs ratio is high; the only 
exception is the under-investment model where the effect is larger in magnitude for firms with 
high LACs–to-CACs ratios relative to firms with low LACs-to-CACs ratios but the difference 
in the coefficients on Investor_Stability is not significant. In Panel B of Table 5, we find that 
long-term investors have a significant and negative effect on labor investment inefficiency only 
for firms with high LACs relative to CACs. Tests on subsamples of over- or under-investing 
firms further confirm that this effect is only significant for firms operating in high LACs-to-
CACs industries. Overall, the results in Table 5 are consistent with the prediction that the 
impact of investor horizons on labor investment inefficiency is more pronounced for firms with 
 
22 Pharmaceuticals, chemicals, business services, and wholesale trade are examples of industries with above-
median LACs-to-CACs ratios. Petroleum and natural gas, primary metal, textiles, and construction materials are 




higher LACs relative to CACs.23 This finding once again underscores the role of factor 
adjustment costs and the differences between labor and capital, thus justifying the need for our 
empirical investigation of the effect of institutional investors’ horizons on labor investment. 
3.3.3 The importance of human capital  
Our analysis has underscored the importance of institutional investor monitoring for 
firms facing greater LACs. However, long-term institutions may also have strong incentives to 
monitor employment decisions when labor is important to the firm’s business model, not 
necessarily when LACs are high. In order to examine this conjecture, we split our cross section 
based on the importance of human capital to a firm. Recent research suggests that firms relying 
more on human capital, particularly skilled workers, tend to have substantial R&D investments 
and intangible assets, including human and organizational capital (e.g., Falato et al. 2018; Klasa 
et al. 2018). Hence, we proxy for human capital importance using R&D and intangible capital 
intensity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets. We 
consider firms with above- (below-) median R&D intensity as placing more (less) importance 
on human capital. To capture intangible capital intensity, we follow Peters and Taylor (2017) 
and define intangible capital as the sum of internally created and externally purchased 
intangible capital. Each year, we define firms with above- (below-) median intangible capital 
to total assets as high (low)-intangible capital-intensive and expect them to place greater (less) 
importance to human capital.  
Panels A and B of Table 6 present the results using R&D intensity and intangible capital 
intensity as proxies for human capital importance, respectively. Throughout all models in both 
 
23 In untabulated tests, we corroborate our evidence on the trade-off argument by performing an additional analysis 
in which we study how the relationship between long-term investors and firms’ capital investment is affected by 
the magnitude of LACs relative to CACs. Consistent with our argument, we find that the role of long-term 
investors in mitigating capital investment inefficiencies is more pronounced with higher CACs-to-LACs ratios. 
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panels the relation between Investor Stability and Abnormal Net Hiring is greater in magnitude 
and more statistically significant for firms that place more importance on human capital than 
those that place less importance on human capital, with the differences in the Investor Stability 
coefficients between the two subsamples of firms being statistically significant. This finding is 
consistent with the prediction that long-term institutional investor monitoring is more stringent 
when human capital is more important to the firm. 
3.4 Further cross-sectional analysis 
To shed more light on the types of firms that are prone to abnormal net hiring and thus 
require more monitoring by long-term institutional investors, we run additional cross-sectional 
tests. We argue that the monitoring role of long-term investors is most pertinent for firms that 
have stronger incentives and/or more opportunities to deviate from expected net hiring through 
earnings management and/or empire building. Hence, we examine how the relation between 
long-term institutional ownership and labor investment efficiency varies with firm complexity, 
corporate governance, financial reporting quality, debt maturity, CEO gender and age as well 
as managerial ownership. First, while complex firms, such as those operating in multiple 
business segments, may enjoy certain benefits of diversification (e.g., the internal capital 
market and co-insurance effect), they face greater agency conflicts and information 
asymmetries (e.g., Denis et al., 1997; Hoechle et al., 2012). As a result, diversified firms tend 
to take suboptimal investment decisions, for instance, via earnings management (Lim et al., 
2008) and empire building (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). To alleviate those incentive 
problems, long-term institutional investors are likely to pay more attention to complex firms. 
In a similar vein, firms with weak governance and low financial reporting quality have greater 
agency problems, operate under greater information asymmetry, and hence provide more 
opportunities to deviate from optimal investment policy (Jung et al., 2014). Therefore, we also 
expect these firms to be monitored more closely by long-term investors. Based on these 
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arguments, we expect the impact of Investor_Stability on under-investment and over-
investment in labor to be more pronounced for firms with a higher degree of firm complexity, 
lower quality of corporate governance, and lower quality of financial reporting. 
Our predictions for the role of the other conditioning variables used in this analysis are 
more nuanced. Prior research shows that short-term debt acts as an effective external 
monitoring mechanism that helps discipline firm management (Myers, 1977; Gul and 
Goodwin, 2010) and alleviate incentive problems, including both underinvestment (Myers, 
1977) and overinvestment (e.g., Huang et al., 2018). This view indicates that the impact of 
long-term investors on both over- and under-investment should be weaker (stronger) for firms 
with shorter (longer)-maturity debt. On the other hand, since short-term debt is associated with 
higher liquidity risk and greater lender enforcement, it may encourage borrowers to engage in 
earnings management (Fung and Goodwin, 2013), particularly to delay the arrival of bad news 
(Gupta et al., 2008). This view suggests that the impact of investor horizons on labor under-
investment may be more pronounced for firms with more short-term debt. 
Recent research argues that because female directors/executives are more ethical and 
risk-averse, firms with female directors/executives follow conservative earnings management 
strategies (Sun et al., 2011) and exhibit high earnings quality (Srinidhi et al., 2011). There is 
also evidence that, as a result of overconfidence, male executives engage in more acquisitions, 
including negative NPV deals, than their female counterparts (Huang and Kisgen, 2013). 
Accordingly, we predict that the impact of long-term institutional investors on both under- and 
over-investment in labor is more (less) pronounced for firms with male (female) CEOs.  
Furthermore, existing studies document mixed evidence on the role of CEO age in 
determining managerial incentives to manage earnings and empire build. Due to compensation 
incentives, young CEOs are likely to be associated with lower financial reporting quality 
(Huang et al., 2012) and greater bad-news-hoarding behavior (Andreou et al., 2017), while they 
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also tend to pursue more acquisitions (Yim, 2013). However, old CEOs, especially those in the 
later stages of their careers, may have incentives to cut R&D expenses (Dechow and Sloan, 
1991) and engage in more earnings management (Demers and Wang, 2010) to boost short-term 
performance and post-retirement market value. In addition, due to career concerns, young 
CEOs may avoid mergers and acquisitions as they are more likely to be fired for poor 
performance (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999), while, due to retirement preferences, old CEOs, 
especially those of target firms, are more likely to engage in merger activity (Jenter and 
Lewellen, 2015). Given the conflicting arguments and evidence, how CEO age affects the link 
between long-term investors and labor investment inefficiency is an empirical question. 
Finally, managerial ownership is associated with different incentives for managers to 
deviate from optimal net hiring. The traditional view argues that greater managerial ownership 
mitigates agency conflicts between managers and shareholders and thus reduces earnings 
management (Warfield et al., 1995) and accounting conservatism (LaFond and Roychowhury, 
2008). Managers with more equity stakes in the firm are also less likely to diversify (Denis et 
al., 1997) and overinvest (Cook and Luo, 2018) while, consistent with managerial risk aversion, 
they may be more likely to “play it safe” (Gormley and Matsa, 2016). However, the competing 
argument suggests that, due to incentives to sell shares in the future, managers with greater 
stock ownership are more likely to manage earnings (Cheng and Warfield, 2005). These 
managers are also more likely to become entrenched and thus have an incentive to pursue 
value-destroying decisions (Narayanan, 1996; Eisdorfer et al., 2013). Again, given the mixed 
evidence in the literature, the question of how managerial ownership influences the association 
between investor horizons and labor investment inefficiency is an empirical one. 
To test the above conjectures, we first run regressions for subsamples of firms with high 
and low firm complexity. We define a firm with a high (low) degree of complexity as one that 
has more (less) than two business segments (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008; Balakrishnan et al., 
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2018; Abernethy et al., 2019). We then examine firms with high and low quality of governance; 
to measure corporate governance quality, we use the Cain et al. (2017) takeover index. We 
consider firms with above- (below-) median takeover index scores to be those with high (low) 
governance quality. Next, we study firms with high and low degrees of financial reporting 
quality. Using a measure of accounting quality based on discretionary accruals (e.g., Dechow 
and Dichev, 2002; McNichols, 2002), we define firms with above- (below-) median accounting 
quality as high (low) reporting quality firms. We then consider the impact of debt maturity by 
splitting our cross section into firms with below- and above-median short-term debt. We also 
partition our sample into firms run by male vs. female CEOs and old (above-median age) vs. 
young (below-median age) CEOs. Finally, we report the results separately for high (above-
median) and low (below-median) managerial ownership firms. Managerial ownership is 
defined as the value of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio based on Daniel et al. (2019). 
Panels A and B of Table 7 report the results for under-investment and over-investment 
in labor, respectively. The results in Panel A show that the coefficient on Investor_Stability is 
only significant and negative in Models 1, 4, 6, 8, 11, and 14 that is, when firms have a higher 
degree of firm complexity, lower quality of corporate governance, lower quality of financial 
reporting, more short-term debt, older CEOs, and lower managerial ownership. The F-test 
results further confirm that the effect of Investor_Stability on labor under-investment is 
economically stronger for those firms than for firms with the opposite characteristics. The 
results in Panel B on over-investment are qualitatively similar. The effect of Investor_Stability 
on over-investment in labor is more pronounced for more complex firms (Models 1 and 2), 
those with lower financial reporting quality (Models 5 and 6), those with male CEOs (Models 
9 and 10), and those with higher managerial ownership (Models 13 and 14). In Models 3 and 
4, the impact of long-term investors on labor over-investment is larger for weakly-governed 
firms than strongly-governed ones, although the difference is not significant. Similarly, in 
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Models 7 and 8 (11 and 12) we document a more pronounced impact for firms with more long-
maturity debt (older CEOs) but the differences in coefficients are not significant. Overall, the 
results are broadly consistent with our conjecture that the effect of long-term investors on labor 
investment inefficiency is stronger among firms that have stronger incentives and/or more 
opportunities to deviate from expected net hiring. 
4. Robustness tests 
4.1 Alternative proxies and models for expected and abnormal net hiring 
A central issue in our research design is how we estimate a firm’s expected (optimal) 
level of investment in employees. To examine the robustness of our results, we next replicate 
our analysis using several alternative measures of expected net hiring. In Panel A of Table 8, 
we estimate augmented models of expected net hiring. Since the original Pinnuck and Lillis 
(2007) model includes only industry fixed effects, in Models 1–3, we include additional fixed 
effects. We control for industry and year fixed effects in Model 1, and then firm and year fixed 
effects in Model 2. In Model 3, we include firm, industry-year, and state-year fixed effects; the 
latter fixed effects capture time varying state characteristics (e.g., geographic location and local 
economic conditions) that could affect the supply of labor to the local labor market. In Model 
4, we estimate an augmented Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) model controlling for year, firm, and 
state fixed effects, as well as eight additional controls that may affect firms’ investment in labor 
and correlate with long-term institutional ownership, namely (a) capital expenditures; (b) R&D 
expenditures; (c) acquisitions; (d) total institutional ownership; (e) payout ratio; (f) corporate 
governance quality; (g) WDL, that is, the time-variant state-level recognition of wrongful 
discharge laws (Serfling, 2016); and (h) future industry sales growth, which captures the 
forward-looking prospects of the industry where a firm operates. To ensure that Model 4 is as 
comprehensive as possible, we include both lagged and contemporaneous values of the 
controls. In Model 5, we interact all the covariates in the original Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) 
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model with institutional ownership; this specification addresses the concern that the impact of 
the determinants of labor investment on expected net hiring is conditional on institutional 
ownership. In Model 6, we apply the methodology proposed by Chen et al. (2018) to deal with 
potential bias in the two-stage estimation procedure where the first-stage residual is used as the 
dependent variable in the second-stage regression. Specifically, we include all the covariates 
from the first-stage estimation of the Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) model in our second stage. The 
results across all models of Panel A are qualitatively similar to our baseline findings.   
We next address the possibility that the distribution of Abnormal Net Hiring may differ 
for firms with different (high vs. low) levels of LACs since these costs may make optimal net 
hiring respond to economic fundamentals in an asymmetric fashion. To account for this, we 
first run the Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) labor demand model separately for firms facing low and 
high LACs to allow for differences in the effects of the independent variables on Net hiring. 
As before, we proxy for LACs using the firms’ reliance on skilled labor (Labor_Skill), our 
preferred measure of LACs that captures both the costs of hiring and firing. For each year, we 
define firms in the top (bottom) 30th percentile of Labor_Skill as high (low) LACs firms. As 
expected, we document significant systematic differences in the coefficients on some economic 
fundamentals and the distribution of Abnormal Net Hiring for firms facing low and high LACs. 
Importantly, we next re-run our main analysis using the estimates for Abnormal Net Hiring 
calculated separately for low and high LACs firms. The results reported in Panel B of Table 8 
suggest that the negative effect of Investor Stability on Abnormal Net Hiring remains 
significant for the whole sample as well as the over- and under-investment subsamples, 
although it is more pronounced when Abnormal Net Hiring is estimated separately for firms 
facing high LACs. 
In Panel C of Table 8, we consider alternative definitions of optimal net hiring that are 
not based on any labor demand regression model. In Model 1, we estimate expected net hiring 
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using the median investment in the firm’s industry (Harvey et al., 2004; Cella, 2014), defining 
industries using the Fama-French (1997) 48-industry classification. In Model 2, we estimate 
expected net hiring using the firm’s average investment in the previous three years (Titman et 
al., 2004; Cella, 2014). In both models, the coefficient on Investor_Stability remains negative 
and highly significant, suggesting that our results are robust to alternative definitions of 
expected net hiring that do not depend on the Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) model or its variants.24 
4.2 Controlling for other types of investments 
Investments in labor may be correlated with other forms of investments, such as capital 
expenditures, R&D expenses, and acquisitions. Thus, a concern with our finding regarding the 
relation between investor horizons and labor investment inefficiencies is that it could be 
primarily driven by contemporaneous non-labor investments. Although in our regressions we 
already include Abn_Non-labor_Invest to control for non-labor investment inefficiencies, we 
follow prior research (Jung et al., 2014) and perform two tests to mitigate the effects of those 
investments. First, we examine scenarios in which investments in employees (net hiring) are 
positively or negatively related to capital expenditures, R&D expenditures, and acquisition 
expenditures; that is, when an increase in net hiring is associated with an increase or decrease 
in the other forms of investment. For each type of non-labor investment, we also study 
subsamples of firms that make investments in labor but report zero or missing values for the 
type of non-labor investment in question. Second, to further control for capital-labor 
complementarity, we examine subsamples of industries in which the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labor is either above or below unity. The results, reported in our Internet 
 
24 In unreported tests, we find that the coefficient on Investor_Stability is only significant for firms that experience 
substantial Abnormal_Net_Hiring and/or consistently deviate from expected net hiring. These results are in line 
with the premise that long-term investors reduce inefficient investment in labor when it is significant and 
persistent, and thus likely to be intentional. 
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Appendix (Section 2 and Table IA.2), show that the coefficient on Investor_Stability is 
significant and negative not only for the subsamples of firms in which labor and non-labor 
investments move in the same direction and likely act as complements, but also for the other 
subsamples. This suggests that our main finding is not simply driven by the relation between 
long-term ownership and non-labor investments. 
4.3 Controlling for alternative explanations 
Even though we formally address endogeneity concerns in Section 5, in what follows 
we carry out a number of tests to control for potential omitted variables or alternative 
explanations that may drive our results. First, a concern with our analysis is that our findings 
could be driven by omitted governance variables rather than monitoring by long-term investors. 
This explanation is based on the view that long-term ownership is associated with good 
governance practices (e.g., Appel et al., 2016), which are correlated with firms’ investment in 
employees. To address this concern, we follow recent studies (e.g., Bhagat and Bolton, 2013; 
Cain et al., 2017) and control for a firm’s governance by including seven variables in our 
regressions: (a) the Gompers et al. (2003) corporate governance index (G-index); (b) the 
Bebchuck et al. (2009) entrenchment index (E-index); (c) the Cain et al. (2017) takeover index 
(Takeover index); (d) the natural logarithm of the dollar value of common stock owned by the 
median director sitting on the board (Direct_Own); (e) the percentage of board members 
classified as independent (Ind_Direct); (f) Duality, which is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of one if the CEO of the sample firm is also the board chair, and zero otherwise; and (g) 
Blockholdings, defined as the number of investors that own at least 5% of a firm’s shares,25 
which helps alleviate the concern that our findings could be primarily driven by investors’ 
ownership concentration rather than by investor horizons. 
 
25 Our result is robust to alternative measures of blockholdings, such as the total ownership of blockholders, total 
ownership of the five largest institutions, ownership of the largest institution, or ownership concentration. 
35 
 
The results reported in Models 1−7 of Panel A in Table 9 show that the impact of 
Investor_Stability on Abnormal_Net_Hiring is unaffected when we separately control for 
different measures of corporate governance.26 In Model 8 of Panel A, we find that our result 
also survives the inclusion of those additional controls all together. In all models the coefficient 
estimate for Investor_Stability remains negative and highly significant.27 Overall, these results 
mitigate the concern that our findings may be driven by the correlation between firms’ long-
term ownership and the quality of their governance practices.  
Another concern with our analysis is that institutional holdings are associated with 
several corporate outcomes that may be correlated with Abnormal_Net_Hiring. Since long-
term investors can affect firms’ investment in capital (Cella, 2014), R&D (Bushee, 1998; 
Aghion et al., 2013; Harford et al., 2018), acquisitions (Gaspar et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007), 
and stakeholder capital (Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; Rubio and Vazquez, 2016, Nguyen et al., 
2020), which are potentially related to labor investments, our inferences could be affected by 
those non-labor investments. Our results could also be driven by financial reporting quality 
because high-quality financial reporting, which is associated with long-term ownership (Burns 
et al., 2010), helps reduce information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, thus leading 
to more efficient investments (Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Biddle et al., 2009), including 
investments in labor (Jung et al., 2014). Meanwhile, our findings may be due to managerial 
ability as long-term shareholders may invest in companies that happen to have more efficient 
 
26 In untabulated tests, we find that the additional results reported in Tables 3 and 4 also remain qualitatively 
unchanged after controlling for the governance characteristics. However, we refrain from using the specification 
with the governance variables throughout the analysis given the significant reduction in the number of 
observations due to missing governance data.  
27 Following Chen et al. (2007) and Fich et al. (2015), we also conduct a two-step analysis (untabulated), where 
in the first step we regress Investor_Stability on firm size, lagged stock return, leverage, Tobin’s Q, and the G-
index. We then use the residual from the above regression as the abnormal level of Investor_Stability; this measure 
captures the investment horizon of the firm’s institutional investors that is unexplained by the governance of the 
firm. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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labor investments simply because they have more able managers. Additionally, since 
investment in labor is costly, it is affected by firms’ cost of capital, degree of financial 
constraints, and ability to access capital markets (Benmelech et al., 2015), which are also 
associated with long-term institutional ownership (e.g., Elyasiani et al., 2010; Attig et al., 2012; 
Attig et al., 2013, Hao, 2014; Huang and Petkevic, 2016). This argument implies that our results 
could be driven by those factors.  
To rule out all these alternative explanations, in Panel B of Table 9, we control for (a) 
non-labor investments, namely, capital expenditures, R&D expenditures, and acquisitions; (b) 
financial reporting quality (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; McNichols 2002); (c) managerial 
ability, proxied by managers’ efficiency, relative to their industry peers, in transforming 
corporate resources into revenues, including their ability to manage employees more efficiently 
(Demerjian et al., 2012);28 (d) the implied cost of capital (e.g., Lau et al., 2010); (e) the degree 
of financial constraints, measured using the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index;29 (f) corporate 
social responsibility, measured using KLD data (Nguyen et al., 2020); and (g) equity issues. 
Models 1–7 of Panel B, Table 9, show that controlling for the above additional variables 
does not affect the statistical and economic significance of the Investor_Stability coefficient. 
Since those models only include the controls separately, in the remainder of Panel B, Table 9, 
we consider two comprehensive models that include those variables all together (Model 8), as 
well as the governance measures used in Panel A (Model 9). We find that the coefficient on 
Investor_Stability remains significantly negative in both models (albeit at the 10% in Model 9 
 
28 Demerjian et al. (2012) use data envelopment analysis to estimate firm efficiency. They then remove from the 
total firm efficiency measure any firm-specific characteristics that are expected to assist or hamper the 
management’s efforts. The unexplained portion of firm efficiency is attributed to management ability.  
29 We note that the results are robust to other conventional measures of financial constraints (e.g., Whited and Wu, 
2006; Hadlock and Pierce, 2010). They also remain qualitatively unchanged when we proxy for financial 
constraints using firms’ investment-cash flow sensitivities (Fazzari et al., 1988).  
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due to the small number of observations used). In sum, the results from Table 9 give us some 
confidence that our results are unlikely to be driven by alternative explanations. 
5. Addressing endogeneity concerns 
Although we have alleviated the omitted-variable bias by controlling for many time-
invariant and time varying effects, concerns remain over the causal interpretation of our 
empirical results because of the potential self-selection in long-term investors’ investment 
decisions and the role of reverse causality inferences. In this section, we present three 
additional analyses to further alleviate concerns about self-selection and endogeneity in 
general. First, we perform PSM to further reduce the impact of omitted (observable) variables 
on our results. Second, we split long-term ownership into indexer and non-indexer ownership, 
which helps us deal with the self-selection problem. Third, and most importantly, we run 
IV/2SLS regressions that take advantage of plausibly exogenous changes in ownership by 
quasi-indexer investors as a result of the annual Russell indexes reconstitutions. 
5.1 Propensity score matching 
Since the characteristics of firms with high Investor_Stability may differ from those 
with low Investor_Stability, we use PSM to control for observable differences in firm and 
industry attributes among the two groups of firms. We match firms with above-median 
Investor_Stability with those with below-median Investor_Stability on year, industry (Fama-
French 48-industry classification), and all the control variables from our baseline regression. 
By matching on industry, we also remove unobserved industry heterogeneity that may be 
correlated with Investor_Stability. The results, reported in our Internet Appendix (Section 3 
and Table IA.3), show that the abnormal net hiring of firms with high investor portfolio stability 
is significantly lower than that of propensity score matched firms with low investor portfolio 
stability, consistent with our main finding. 
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5.2 Indexer versus non-indexer long-term investors 
Following Derrien et al. (2013) and Nguyen et al. (2020), we use long-term indexers to 
mitigate the impact of self-selection. Using indexers is appropriate for our analysis for two 
main reasons. First, long-term indexers are passive investors that are widely diversified and do 
not trade much. They cannot choose their portfolio firms based on the firms’ labor investment 
efficiency because they must replicate an index; their incentive is to minimize the tracking error 
relative to their benchmark index. Therefore, long-term indexers are plausibly exogenous; that 
is, they are not affected by self-selection. Second, index funds do not have the flexibility to sell 
their holdings of stocks. As a result of this inability to follow the “Wall Street Rule”, they are 
more likely to try to influence the firms in which they invest through “voice” or private 
negotiations (Carleton et al., 1998; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; Becht et al., 2009; Fenn 
and Robinson, 2009). As Derrien et al. (2013) and Nguyen et al. (2020) argue, indexers cannot 
be active investors, but they can play an activist role.  
To examine the effect of long-term indexers on abnormal net hiring, we use Bushee’s 
(1998) classifications of institutional investors: transient, dedicated, and quasi-indexer. We 
focus on the shareholdings by dedicated and quasi-indexer investors in each firm, who by 
definition are likely to be long-term investors. The results, reported in our Internet Appendix 
(Section 4 and Table IA.4), indicate that both types of long-term institutional ownership are 
negatively associated with abnormal net hiring. Overall, by showing that our results hold for 
reasonably exogenous long-term indexers, we can largely mitigate the concern that our 
inferences may be driven by self-selection. 
5.3 Russell indexes’ reconstitutions 
In this analysis, we follow recent studies (e.g., Appel et al., 2016, 2019; Crane et al., 
2016; Schmidt and Fahlenbrach, 2017) and use the annual reconstitutions of the Russell 1000 
and 2000 indexes as a source of exogenous variation to the ownership by long-term indexer 
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investors to identify its impact on labor investment efficiency.30 The Russell 1000 (2000) index 
includes the 1000 (1001−3000) largest US listed firms by market capitalization. Both indexes 
are value weighted and exhibit highly significant differences in weights between firms at the 
top and bottom of each index (Appel et al., 2016). Indexer investors that track these indexes 
have strong incentives to apply similar weights to their index-mimicking portfolios since they 
wish to minimize their tracking error. Thus, indexers are expected to hold relatively large 
(small) equity positions in firms ranked at the top (bottom) of each index.  
FTSE Russell reconstitutes the indexes on an annual cycle (every June) using firms’ 
end-of-May market capitalizations. Following Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017), we focus on 
firms that switch from one index to the other as a result of these reconstitutions, since they are 
bound to experience significant changes in long-term indexer investment. This is particularly 
true for firms that are close to the Russell 1000/2000 threshold; that is, they were at the bottom 
of 1000 but moved to the top of 2000, or vice versa. These switches around the threshold should 
lead to exogenous changes in long-term indexer ownership since we can safely assume that 
index assignment around the threshold is random (Appel et al., 2016; Schmidt and Fahlenbrach, 
2017). In other words, managers cannot take decisions that affect market capitalization in a 
way that will accurately predict index assignment so close to the threshold. 
Following the arguments presented in Section 5.2, we expect a significant increase in 
long-term indexer holdings to lead to a reduction in labor investment inefficiency. To test this 
 
30 We note that long-term dedicated investors may have stronger incentives to monitor than long-term indexers. 
However, our analysis aims to further alleviate endogeneity concerns and the literature has been unable to identify 
any shocks that would lead to exogenous changes in long-term dedicated ownership. Hence, we focus on long-
term passive investors; our setting exploits an exogenous variation in these investors’ ownership and, to the extent 
that they also play a monitoring role, as argued in Section 5.2, our test provides indirect inference about the 
monitoring channel. Furthermore, it would have been preferable to use Investor_Stability as in our earlier tests. 
However, Investor_Stability captures the investment horizon of the average institutional investor with positive 
shareholdings in a firm, which by construction is bound to be less sensitive to an event that leads to changes in 
the investment levels of only one type of institutional investors, that is, indexers. 
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prediction, we follow recent research (e.g., Schmidt and Fahlenbrach, 2017) and run 2SLS 
estimations; see our Internet Appendix (Section 5) for additional evidence justifying our 
estimation approach and a detailed discussion of why it is inappropriate to adopt a regression 
discontinuity design. As in Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017), we use three instrumental 
variables: the first two are indicator variables equal to one if a stock switches from the Russell 
1000 index to the Russell 2000 index (R1000 t-1 → R2000 t) or the Russell 2000 index to the 
Russell 1000 index (R2000 t-1 → R1000 t) at the annual Russell index reconstitution. The third 
instrument tracks the change in index rank from one year to another (Rank t − Rank t-1) based 
on end-of-May market capitalization. The first-stage dependent variable is the annual change 
in quasi-indexer ownership (ΔQuasi-indexer Ownership) measured at the end of the first 
quarter following the reconstitution, whereas the annual change in abnormal net hiring 
(ΔAbnormal_Net_Hiring) becomes the second-stage dependent variable.31 We note that all 
results are estimated using ranks implied by firms’ end-of-May CRSP market capitalization. 
Table 10 reports the results from these 2SLS regressions. We consider two model 
specifications. In Panel A, we include the same set of controls as in Schmidt and Fahlenbrach 
(2017). In Panel B, we further add the controls from our baseline specification (Eq. (6)) and 
the float adjusted market cap (Appel et al., 2016; Crane et al., 2016). In both panels, we focus 
on switches that are close to the threshold (i.e., those switches resulting from small changes in 
market capitalization). Specifically, we examine two subsamples of firms that switched by at 
most 200 and 100 ranks between the two Russell indexes. We do not study all switchers 
 
31 Our sample consists of the Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 index constituents during the 1991−2006 period. 
Similar to Appel et al. (2016) and Crane et al. (2016), our sample period ends in 2006. This is because Russell 
modified its indexing methodology in 2007 by introducing a “banding” policy, which allows firms that should 
otherwise switch indexes to remain within their index if their market capitalizations did not deviate much from 
the threshold. This banding policy could potentially affect the local continuity of firm assignment around the 
threshold and would likely violate the exclusion restriction because the assignment of firms into the indexes is no 
longer affected only by market capitalization rankings. 
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because switches far from the threshold may happen as a result of large changes in market 
capitalization, which could in turn be related to unobservable changes in firms’ characteristics. 
This means that the index switch may affect labor investment efficiency not only through its 
impact on long-term ownership, which could violate the exclusion restriction.  
In Panel A of Table 10, the first-stage regression results suggest that for both samples 
of switchers, the coefficients on the instruments are highly significant and with the anticipated 
sign. In particular, the coefficient on R1000 t-1 → R2000 t (R2000 t-1 → R1000 t) is positive 
(negative) and highly significant, consistent with the prediction that Quasi-indexer Ownership 
increases (decreases) as firms move from the bottom of the Russell 1000 index to the top of 
the Russell 2000 index (the top of the Russell 2000 index to the bottom of the Russell 1000 
index). The coefficient on Rank t  − Rank t-1 is negative and significant, which is expected given 
that as firms move to higher ranks (i.e., when the variable takes negative values), the index 
weights become larger, and therefore indexer investors increase their holdings. Diagnostic tests 
(i.e., the F- and J-tests) both suggest that these instruments are valid. Importantly, the second-
stage results show that the coefficient on the fitted ΔQuasi-indexer Ownership is negative and 
highly significant, consistent with the prediction that increases in long-term ownership lead to 
reductions in labor investment inefficiency.  
Panel B of Table 10 shows that the results are robust to including the original controls 
used in our baseline analysis and the float adjustment market cap. Specifically, in the first-stage 
regressions, the coefficients on the three instruments R1000 t-1 → R2000 t , R2000 t-1 → R1000 
t, and Rank t  − Rank t-1 remain significant with the expected signs. Diagnostic tests are also 
satisfactory. Moreover, in the second-stage regressions, ΔQuasi-indexer Ownership continues 
to have a negative and significant impact on ΔAbnormal_Net_Hiring. The magnitude of the 
effect appears to be larger for firms around the threshold, which are expected to experience the 
largest change in Quasi-indexer Ownership.  
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Overall, our results are robust to controlling for sample selection and endogeneity 
concerns. Even though we cannot completely rule out these issues affecting our inferences, 
collectively our findings point to a causal effect of long-term institutional investors on labor 
investment efficiency. Still, since our tests do not directly capture monitoring by those investors 
(McCahery et al., 2016), our results should only be regarded as indirect inference about the 
role of long-term institutional investor monitoring in improving employment decisions. 
6. Additional analysis: the role of short-term investors 
We have focused on the role of long-term institutional investors since we consider them 
to be the shareholders primarily engaging in monitoring within a firm. Still, we acknowledge 
that there are alternative views in the extant literature regarding the monitoring incentives of 
short-term investors. Hence, we now perform additional analysis to test two different views 
about the impact of short-term ownership on labor investment efficiency. The first view 
predicts that short-term investors do not play an effective monitoring role and thus should not 
reduce abnormal net hiring. This is because short-term investors may have weak incentives to 
monitor managers, as they have little time to learn about the firm during the short period in 
which they hold its shares, and hence face significant monitoring costs (e.g., Gaspar et al., 
2005). Due to the lack of effective monitoring, firms with short-term ownership tend to do 
worse in takeovers (Gaspar et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007). Additionally, short-term investors 
may lead to managerial myopia (e.g., Stein, 1989; Froot et al., 1992; Von Thadden, 1995) and 
short-term incentives (Bolton et al., 2006). Managers concerned with short-term results may 
therefore engage in earnings management (e.g., Bushee, 1998) while under-investing to 
temporarily boost the short-term stock price (Bolton et al., 2006), especially if their actions are 
not likely to be detected and/or do not lead to wealth extraction from shareholders. Empirically, 
Cremers et al. (2019) provide causal evidence that the presence of short-horizon investors has 
a positive impact on short-term earnings but a negative one on long-term investment.  
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However, the alternative view argues that short-term investors may improve firm 
governance and hence reduce labor investment inefficiency. This view is based on two 
arguments. First, activist hedge funds, typically classified as short-term, may propose strategic, 
operational, and financial improvements in firms, leading to increases in their long-term 
shareholder value (Brav et al., 2008; Brav et al., 2015; Boyson et al., 2017). Second, even when 
short-term investors are not activists, they may still play a monitoring role by incorporating 
relevant information about firms into their stock prices quickly through their trading (Edmans, 
2009). However, for short-term investors to be effective monitors, they need to rely on the 
support of other types of investors, including investors with long horizons (Harford et al., 2018; 
Appel et al., 2019). Since short-term hedge funds tend to hold a small fraction of the firm’s 
ownership, the success of their campaign may depend on the role of those investors with a 
vested interest in the firm, that is, investors with long horizons. Likewise, Harford et al. (2018) 
argue that even when short-term investors help provide value relevant information through 
stock price signals, it is the action by long-term investors that influences managers and ensures 
that these stock price signals are translated into appropriate corporate policies. Overall, these 
arguments suggest that, together with other investors, those investors with short investment 
horizons can help monitor firms and reduce labor investment inefficiency. 
To test those conflicting views, we regress Abnormal_Net_Hiring on short-term 
ownership while controlling for the role of long-term investors. The results in Model 1 of Table 
11 show that long-term investors have a significant and negative effect on labor investment 
inefficiency, consistent with our baseline finding. However, after controlling for long-horizon 
investors, the impact of short-term ownership is significant and positive, consistent with the 
first view that rather than playing a monitoring role, short-term investors might have incentives 
to exacerbate labor investment inefficiency. In the next two models of Table 11, we study the 
type of labor inefficiency short-term investors are associated with. In Model 2, there is no 
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evidence that short-term ownership is associated with over-investment. Model 3, however, 
shows that short-term ownership is positively correlated with under-investment in labor, 
although the effect is only significant at the 10% level. In Models 4 and 5, we attempt to better 
understand when short-term investors are associated with under-investment. Specifically, we 
rerun our regression for subsamples of firms with different probabilities of earnings 
manipulation, measured using the M-score (Beneish, 1999). The results show that short-term 
investors are associated with firms that engage in under-investment and earnings management 
only when the likelihood of earnings manipulation being detected is low. Again, this finding is 
consistent with the first view about the role of short-term investors. In sum, our results provide 
evidence consistent with a “dark side” of short-term institutional ownership. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper examines the relationship between the investment horizon of institutional 
shareholders and the efficiency of their portfolio firms’ labor investments. We argue that 
monitoring, or the threat of monitoring, by long-term investors deters managers from deviating 
from the optimal level of investment in employees. Consistent with this argument, we find that 
abnormal net hiring, measured as the absolute deviation from net hiring predicted by economic 
fundamentals, decreases in the presence of long-term investors. Our evidence suggests that the 
presence of long-term investors mitigates both over-investment and under-investment in labor.  
We also show that the monitoring role of long-term investors is more pronounced for 
firms facing higher labor adjustment costs or higher costs of adjusting labor relative to capital, 
as well as those placing greater importance on their labor force. This finding supports the 
argument that long-term investors play a stronger monitoring role when deviation from the 
optimal labor demand policy would be more costly to the firm, or when human capital is more 
important to its business success. In further cross-sectional analysis, we find that the effect of 
long-term ownership on labor investment inefficiency is more pronounced for firms that are 
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more complex, have weaker corporate governance, lower financial reporting quality, shorter-
maturity debt, male or older CEOs as well as different levels of managerial ownership, 
consistent with the idea that monitoring by long-term investors is more important for firms that 
have stronger incentives and/or greater opportunities to deviate from optimal net hiring. 
To mitigate sample selection and endogeneity concerns, we perform several additional 
tests. Specifically, we estimate model specifications that control for alternative explanations. 
We also show that our main results hold for both potentially endogenous long-term non-
indexers and plausibly exogenous long-term indexers, which helps mitigate sample selection 
concerns. In addition, we run analyses using PSM. Importantly, we conduct IV regressions 
aimed at examining the impact of exogenous changes to long-term ownership on changes in 
labor investment inefficiency as a result of the annual reconstitution of the Russell 1000 and 
2000 indexes. The results from these analyses support our main findings and all point to a 
causal effect of long-term investment on labor investment efficiency.  
However, caution should be taken in interpreting our results. Although our analyses 
consistently show that institutional investors play an important role in shaping firm-level 
employment decisions, they only provide indirect inference about the mechanism driving the 
result, namely, monitoring by long-term institutional investors. This is indeed a common 
drawback facing this line of research (Harford et al., 2018), since most of the monitoring by 
institutional owners involves private communication and “behind the scenes” intervention 
(McCahery et al., 2016), and hence is quite challenging to directly measure. Future research 
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Investor_Turnover The weighted average of the turnover rates of all institutional investors in a firm’s 
ownership structure based on Gaspar et al. (2005). 
Investor_Stability Investor_Turnover multiplied by -1. 
Institutional Ownership Percentage of shares owned by institutional investors. 
Dedicated_Ownership Percentage of shares owned by dedicated institutional investors based on Bushee (1998). 




The number of institutions whose ownership is at least 5% of the firm’s outstanding 
shares. 
Labor investment variables 
Net_Hiring Percentage change in the number of employees (emp).  
Expected_Net_Hiring Expected percentage change in the number of employees (emp) based on the Pinnuck 
and Lillis (2007) model. 
Abnormal_Net_Hiring |Actual_Net_Hiring – Expected_Net_Hiring| 
Over-investment Positive abnormal net hiring. 
Under-investment Negative abnormal net hiring. 
Over-hiring Over-investment when the expected level of net hiring is positive. 
Under-firing Over-investment when the expected level of net hiring is negative. 
Under-hiring Under-investment when the expected level of net hiring is positive. 
Over-firing Under-investment when the expected level of net hiring is negative. 
 
Firm characteristics 
Sales_Growth Percentage change in sales revenue (sale). 
Profit Net income (ni) scaled by beginning-of-year total assets (at). 
∆Profit The change in net income (ni) scaled by beginning-of-year total assets (at). 
Return Total stock return in the last 12 months. 
Size The logarithm of the firm’s book value of assets (at). 
Quick_Ratio The ratio of cash and short-term investments (che) plus receivables (rect) to current 
liabilities (lct). 
Leverage Long-term debt (dltt) plus debt in current liabilities (dlc), all scaled by the book value of 
assets (at). 
Loss_Bins Five dummy variables indicating each interval of profitability of length 0.005 from 0 to 
-0.025. For example, Loss_Bin1 takes the value of one if Profit is between -0.005 and 0 
and zero otherwise, and so on for the other Loss_Bins. 
Market-to-book Book value of assets (at) plus the market value of common equity (prcc_f  csho) minus 
the book value of common equity (ceq), all scaled by the book value of assets (at). 
Dividend Dummy A dummy variable set equal to one in years in which a firm pays common dividends 
(dvc), and zero otherwise. 
Cash Flow Volatility The standard deviation of the ratio of firm-level cash flow (oibdp − xint − txt − dvc) to 
assets (at) for the previous five years. 
Sales Volatility The standard deviation of firm-level sales revenue (sale) for the previous five years. 
Net Hiring Volatility The standard deviation of a firm’s Net_Hiring for the previous five years. 
Tangibility The ratio of property, plant, and equipment (ppent) to total assets (at). 
Loss Dummy A dummy variable set equal to one in years in which a firm makes a loss (Profit < 0). 
Labor Intensity The ratio of the number of employees (emp) to total assets (at). 
Abn_Non-labor_Invest Abnormal non-labor investments, defined as the absolute value of the residual from the 
regression of Non-labor_Invest on Sales_Growth where Non-labor_Invest is measured 
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as the sum of capital expenditure (capx), acquisition expenditure (aqc), and research and 
development expenditure (xrd), less cash receipts from the sale of property, plant, and 
equipment (sppe), all scaled by lagged total assets. 





j=1 , where Eji 
is the number of employees in industry i working in occupation j, Ei is the total number 
of employees in industry i, O is the total number of occupations in industry i, and Zj is 
the U.S. Department of Labor’s O*NET program classification of occupations based on 
skill level. 
WDL WDL measures the strength of Wrongful Discharge Laws (WDLs) in the state where the 
firm is headquartered and is constructed by summing three distinct dummy variables for 
each of the three WDLs exceptions, where each dummy is set equal to one if the firm is 




Accounting Quality is defined based on Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model and its 
modification by McNichols (2002). The model is a regression of working capital 
accruals on one-year-lagged, current, and one-year-ahead cash flows from operations, 
the change in revenue, and property, plant, and equipment. The model is estimated by 
industry-year and the residuals are collected. We then compute the standard deviation of 
the residuals over the years t-5 to t-1. The standard deviation is then multiplied by -1. 
Asset Redeployability measures the extent to which a firm’s assets have alternative uses within and across 
industries; based on Kim and Kung (2017). 
Firm Complexity A firm is defined as complex if it has more than two business segments. 
  
Governance variables 
G-index The Gompers et al. (2003) corporate governance index of 24 antitakeover provisions. 
E-index The Bebchuck et al. (2009) managerial entrenchment index. 
Direct_Own The natural log of the dollar value of common stock owned by the median director based 
on Bhagat and Bolton (2013).   
Ind_Direct The percentage of board members classified as independent. 
Duality An indicator variable that takes the value of one if the CEO of the sample firm is also 
the board chair, and zero otherwise. 
Takeover Index Cain et al.’s (2017) index of takeover susceptibility constructed using determinants from 
the legal environment and other plausibly exogenous variables such as aggregate capital 




Managerial Ability Managers’ efficiency, relative to their industry peers, in transforming corporate 






Appendix B: Table B. Estimation of the expected level of net hiring 
 
 
This table reports the regression results for the estimation of the expected level of net hiring using Pinnuck and 
Lillis’ (2007) labor demand model. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-statistics in parentheses are 
based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
              Dependent variable: Net hiring 
Variables            Predicted 
         Sign 
 
   
Sales_Growth t + 0.313*** 
(28.96) 
Sales_Growth t-1 + 0.050*** 
(9.37) 
Profit t + 0.090***  
(5.45) 
ΔProfit t - -0.030 
(-1.48) 
ΔProfit t-1 + -0.001 
(-1.09) 
Return t + 0.027*** 
 (10.83) 
Size t-1 + 0.003*** 
 (6.68) 
Quick_Ratio t-1 + 0.008*** 
 (8.42) 
ΔQuick_Ratio t-1 + 0.000*** 
 (2.60) 
ΔQuick_Ratio t +/- -0.001 
(-0.64) 
Leverage t-1 - -0.062***   
(-9.33) 
Loss_Bin1 t-1 - -0.018**  
(-2.35) 


















+/- -0.017***  
(-4.28) 
Industry fixed effects          Yes 
Observations       51,414 






Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics for the labor investment, ownership, and control variables used in our main 
analysis. We also report descriptive statistics for the control variables used in the estimation of the expected level 
of net hiring. Our sample consists of 51,414 firm-year observations representing 6,313 unique firms over the 
period 1982 to 2015. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median Q1 Q4 












Expected_Net_Hiring 0.050 0.116 0.040 -0.004 0.085 













Dedicated Ownership  0.055 0.069 0.032 0.007 0.078 
Quasi-indexer Ownership  0.303 0.203 0.287 0.123 0.465 
Institutional Ownership  0.434 0.277 0.425 0.184 0.669 
Other variables:      
Sales_Growth  0.105 0.326 0.069 -0.021 0.175 
Profit  0.020 0.165 0.047 -0.003 0.092 
Return 0.173 0.596 0.085 -0.178 0.381 
Size 5.606 2.011 5.470 4.127 6.955 
Quick_Ratio  1.822 2.075 1.226 0.800 2.006 
Leverage  0.220 0.201 0.191 0.049 0.330 
Market-to-book  2.527 3.446 1.782 1.088 2.995 
Dividend Dummy 0.440 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Cash Flow Volatility  0.058 0.334 0.029 0.016 0.057 
Sales Volatility  0.187 0.648 0.132 0.077 0.225 
Tangibility  0.291 0.216 0.240 0.122 0.404 
Loss Dummy 0.257 0.437 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Net Hiring Volatility  0.285 2.388 0.131 0.073 0.230 
Labor Intensity  0.010 0.011 0.007 0.003 0.013 
Abn_Non-labor_Invest  0.096 0.112 0.075 0.040 0.110 
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Table 2. The relation between investor horizons and abnormal net hiring 
 
This table reports the regression results on the impact of institutional investment horizons on abnormal net hiring. 
In Model 1, we regress Abnormal_Net_Hiring on the set of control variables, and industry and year fixed effects. 
In Model 2, we include Investor_Stability as an additional explanatory variable. In Model 3, we repeat the 
specification of Model 2 but also control for state fixed effects. In Model 4, we include industry-year and state-
year fixed effects instead of controlling for industry, year, and state fixed effects separately. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm 












     
























































































































Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes  No 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No 
State fixed effects No No Yes No 
Industry-year fixed effects No No No Yes 
State-year fixed effects No No No Yes 
Observations  51,414 51,414 51,414 51,241 







Table 3. Investor horizon and specific types of labor investment inefficiency 
 
This table reports the regression results on the impact of institutional investment horizon on specific types of labor 
investment inefficiency. In Panel A, we examine the relation between investor horizon and over-investment in 
labor. Panel B reports the results on the relation between investor horizon and under-investment in labor. In 
Models 1 and 2 of Panel A, we estimate Eq. (6) for a subsample of over-investing firms where over-investment is 
defined as positive abnormal net hiring. In Models 3–6 of Panel A, we further decompose over-investment into 
over-hiring and under-firing. A firm over-hires (under-fires) if it over-invests when its expected level of net hiring 
is positive (negative). In Models 1 and 2 of Panel B, we estimate Eq. (6) for a subsample of under-investing firms, 
where under-investment is defined as negative abnormal net hiring. In Models 3–6 of Panel B, we further 
decompose under-investment into under-hiring and over-firing. A firm under-hires (over-fires) if it under-invests 
when its expected level of net hiring is positive (negative). All regressions include year and industry fixed effects, 
and all the covariates from our baseline specification. In Models 2, 4, and 6, we also control for state fixed effects. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
  
Panel A. The relation between investor horizon and over-investment in labor 
 















       












       
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations  21,422 21,422 15,816 15,816 5,606 5,606 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.14 
 
Panel B. The relation between investor horizon and under-investment in labor 
 















       












       
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations  29,992 29,992 21,727 21,727 8,265 8,265 






Table 4. The role of labor adjustment costs 
 
This table presents the impact of institutional investment horizon on abnormal net hiring for firms facing high 
labor adjustment costs (LACs) versus firms facing low LACs. In Panel A, we proxy for LACs using the strength 
of wrongful discharge laws (WDL) in the state where a firm is headquartered. For each year, we define firms with 
a WDL score of 3 (i.e., firms in states that recognize all three exceptions) as high LACs firms and those with a 
WDL score of 0 (i.e., firms in states that recognize none of the exceptions) as low LACs firms. In Panel B, we 
proxy for LACs using firms’ reliance on skilled labor (Labor_Skill). For each year, we define firms in the top 
(bottom) 30th percentile of Labor_Skill as high (low) LACs firms. The last row reports the p-values of the F-tests 
for differences in the coefficients on Investor_Stability for the two subsamples of high and low LACs firms. All 
regressions include year and industry fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Proxy for LACs: Wrongful discharge laws 
 
Panel B. Proxy for LACs: Reliance on skilled labor 
 
  





















       












       
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  6,502 7,515 2,827 3,072 3,675 4,443 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.13 
p-value (F-test of equal 
coefficient estimates  on 
Investor_Stability) 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.12)  





















       












       
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  11,313 5,186 4,745 2,159 6,568 3,027 
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.12 
p-value (F-test of equal 
coefficient estimates on 
Investor_Stability) 
(0.06)  (0.02)  (0.89)  
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Table 5. The role of differences between labor and capital adjustment costs. 
 
This table presents the impact of institutional investment horizon on abnormal net hiring for firms facing varying 
degrees of labor and capital adjustment costs. In Panels A and B, we report the results for firms with a high (above-
median) ratio of labor adjustment costs (LACs) to capital adjustment costs (CACs) versus firms with a low (below-
median) ratio of LACs to CACs. In Panel A, we proxy for LACs using firms’ reliance on skilled labor, and we 
proxy for CACs using firms’ asset redeployability (Kim and Kung, 2017). In Panel B, we measure LACs and 
CACs using the industry estimates from Hall (2004). The last row reports the p-values of the F-tests for differences 
in the coefficients on Investor_Stability for the compared subsamples. All regressions include year and industry 
fixed effects. All the other variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Ratio of labor to capital adjustment costs: Labor skill and asset redeployability 
 































       












       
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  12,881 12,530 5,262 5,321 7,268 7,560 
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.15 
p-value (F-test of equal 
coefficient estimates on 
Investor_Stability) 
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.26)  



























       












       
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  14,690 13,922 5,599 5,400 9,091 8,522 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.11 
p-value (F-test of equal 
coefficient estimates on 
Investor_Stability) 
(0.03)  (0.59)  (0.01)  
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Table 6. The importance of human capital 
 
This table shows how the impact of institutional investment horizon on abnormal net hiring is affected by the 
importance that the firm attaches to its employees. In Panel A, we proxy for the importance of human capital to a 
firm using R&D intensity measured as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets. Each year, we define firms 
with above (below)-median R&D expenditure to total assets as high (low)-R&D-intensive. In Panel B, we proxy 
for the importance of human capital using intangible capital intensity. We follow Peters and Taylor (2017) and 
define Intangible capital as the sum of internally created and externally purchased intangible capital. We measure 
the stock of internally created intangible capital as the sum of Knowledge capital, which we estimate by 
accumulating past R&D spending using the perpetual inventory method, and Organizational capital, which we 
estimate by accumulating a fraction (30%) of past selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses using 
the same method. Externally purchased intangible capital is the balance sheet item Intangible Assets (intan). We 
scale Intangible capital by the book value of total assets (at). Each year, we define firms with above (below)-
median Intangible capital to total assets as high (low)-intangible capital-intensive. The last row reports the p-
values of the F-tests for differences in the coefficients on Investor_Stability for for each pair of subsamples. All 
regressions include year and industry fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. R&D intensity 
 
Panel B. Intangible capital intensity 
 
  















       












       
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  25,665 24,908 10,085 10,951 15,580 13,957 
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.13 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.11 
p-value (F-test of equal 
coefficient estimates on 
Investor_Stability) 
(0.05)  (0.10)  (0.06)  
 Whole Sample       Over-investment Under-investment 












       












       
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  26,813 24,601 10,742 10,680 16,071 13,921 
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.11 0.22 0.12 0.15 0.15 
p-value (F-test of equal 
coefficient estimates on 
Investor_Stability) 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.07)  
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Table 7. Investor horizon and labor investment inefficiency: Cross-sectional variation 
 
Panel A (B) examines the relation between investor horizon and under- (over-) investment in labor for subsamples of firms with different characteristics. Over-investing firms 
are defined as those with positive abnormal net hiring. Under-investing firms are defined as those with negative abnormal net hiring. In Models 1 and 2, we examine firms with 
a high degree of complexity versus firms with a low degree of complexity. Firm complexity is a dummy variable set equal to one if a firm has more than two business segments, 
and zero otherwise. In Models 3 and 4, we present the results for firms with varying degrees of corporate governance quality. We proxy for corporate governance quality using 
Cain et al.’s (2017) takeover index. Firms with above-median (below-median) takeover index are defined as high (low) governance quality firms. In Models 5 and 6, we present 
the results for firms with varying degrees of financial reporting quality. Firms with above-median (below-median) accounting quality are defined as high (low) reporting quality 
firms. Accounting Quality is defined in Appendix A. In Models 7 and 8, we present the results for firms with below-median (above-median) short-term debt. Short-term debt 
is the ratio of debt due in the next three years to total debt ((dlc + dd2 + dd3)/(dltt + dlc)). In Models 9 and 10, we present the results for firms with male versus female CEOs. 
In Models 11 and 12, we present the results for firms with old (above-median age) versus young (below-median age) CEOs. In Models 13 and 14, we report the results for high 
(above-median) and low (below-median) managerial ownership, defined as the value of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio (based on Daniel et al., 2019). The last row reports 
the p-values of the F-tests for differences in the coefficients on Investor_Stability for the two subsamples being compared. All regressions include year and industry fixed 
effects. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 










































































               
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  16,845 11,860 12,131 12,009 8,502 8,152 12,947 12,727 5,337 217 2,256 2,304 4,972 5,064 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.11 
p-value (F-test) (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.39)  (0.03)  (0.08)  
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Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year & industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  11,762 8,857 9,998 10,376 5,590 5,637 9,680 9,236 3,854 128 1,720 1,805 3,743 3,331 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.22 0.14 0.18 0.07 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.19 




Table 8. Expected net hiring: Robustness tests and alternative proxies  
 
This table presents the results of robustness tests in which we replicate our main analysis using several alternative 
estimations of the Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) (P&L) model (Panels A and B), and alternative measures of expected 
net hiring (Panel C). In all models, we regress Abnormal_Net_Hiring on Investor_Stability and the control 
variables. In Model 1 of Panel A, we estimate expected net hiring using the P&L model with industry and year 
fixed effects. In Model 2, we estimate expected net hiring using the P&L model after adding time effects and 
replacing the industry dummies with firm fixed effects. In Model 3, we estimate expected net hiring using the 
P&L model controlling for firm, industry-year, and state-year fixed effects. In Model 4, we estimate expected net 
hiring using the P&L model controlling for year, firm, and state fixed effects as well as eight additional controls. 
In particular, we control for (a) capital expenditures measured as the ratio of capital expenditures (capx) to total 
assets (at); (b) R&D expenditures measured as the ratio of R&D expenses (xrd) to net sales (sale), and is set equal 
to zero when R&D expenses (xrd) are missing; (c) Acquisitions measured as the ratio of acquisitions (aqc) to total 
assets (at); (d) Institutional ownership; (e) Payout ratio defined as the ratio of common dividends (dvc) to total 
assets (at); (f) corporate governance quality measured by Cain et al.’s (2017) takeover index; (g) WDL, which 
captures the time-variant state-level recognition of wrongful discharge laws (Serfling, 2016); and (h) future 
industry sales growth, which captures the forward-looking prospects of the industry where a firm operates. All 
the covariates in Model 4 are included in both lagged and contemporaneous forms. In Model 5, we interact all the 
covariates in the original P&L model with institutional ownership. In Model 6, we apply the methodology 
proposed by Chen et al. (2018) to deal with potential bias in the two-stage estimation. Specifically, we include all 
the covariates from the first-stage estimation of the P&L model in our second stage. In Panel B, we estimate 
expected net hiring using the P&L model separately for firms facing high labor adjustment costs (LACs) versus 
firms facing low LACs. We proxy for LACs using firms’ reliance on skilled labor (Labor_Skill). For each year, 
we define firms in the top (bottom) 30th percentile of Labor_Skill as high (low) LACs firms.  In Panel C, we use 
alternative measures of expected net hiring that do not rely on the P&L model. In Model 1, we estimate expected 
net hiring using the median investment in the firm’s industry. Industries are defined using the Fama-French (1997) 
48-industry classification. In Model 2, we measure expected net hiring using the firm’s average investment in the 
previous three years. All regressions for the second stage include year and industry fixed effects. All the other 
variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 


























































       












       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 51,414 51,414 51,414 42,619 51,414 51,414 
Adjusted R2: 1st stage 0.23 0.28 0.28 0.38 0.24 0.23 







Panel B. Pinnuck and Lillis model: Subsamples with different LACs 
 
 






Expected Net Hiring 
= industry median 
(1) 
 
Expected Net Hiring 
= average in past 3 years 
(2) 
   




   
Controls Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 51,414 26,882 
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.14 
 
 




















       












       
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  6,502 7,515 2,822 3,072 3,675 4,443 
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.15 
p-value (F-test of equal 
coefficient estimates on 
Investor_Stability) 
(0.07)  (0.02)  (0.70)  
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Table 9. Controlling for alternative explanations 
 
This table reports the regression results on the impact of institutional investment horizons on abnormal net hiring, 
controlling for various firm-level corporate governance variables (Panel A) and variables that have been shown 
by previous papers to be related to investor horizon (Panel B). G-index is the Gompers et al. (2003) corporate 
governance index of 24 antitakeover provisions. E-index is the Bebchuck et al. (2009) managerial entrenchment 
index. Takeover Index is the Cain et al. (2017) takeover index. Direct_Own is the natural log of the dollar value 
of common stock owned by the median director. Ind_Director is the percentage of board members classified as 
independent. CEO Duality is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the CEO of the sample firm is also 
the board chair, and zero otherwise. Blockholdings is the number of institutions whose ownership is at least 5% 
of the firm’s outstanding shares. For non-labor investments, we control for capital expenditures, R&D 
expenditures, and acquisitions. Cost of capital is the implied cost of capital estimated following Lau et al. (2010). 
Financial constraints is proxied using the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (KZ) index. CSR is corporate social 
responsibility, which is measured using KLD data following Nguyen et al. (2020). Equity issues is the ratio of 
equity issues (sstk) to total assets. In Panel A, Models 1–7 control separately for each governance variable. Model 
8 controls for all the governance variables. In Panel B, Models 1–7 control separately for each variable. Model 8 
controls for all the variables in Panels A and B with a comparable number of non-missing observations to the 
main sample; these include the takeover index, blockholdings, non-labor investments, financial reporting quality, 
managerial ability, equity issues, and financial constraints. Model 9 controls for all the variables in Panels A and 
B. All the other variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 





































         
















         
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  5,883 5,883 49,515 6,146 6,304 6,331 46,019 5,682 
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.15 
 
 




































































          


















          
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  51,003 43,896 50,898 5,472 50,211 5,400 50,288 42,479 1,405 





Table 10. Identification strategy: The reconstitution of Russell indexes 
 
This table reports the results from instrumental variable (IV) regressions using two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimations. The dependent variable in the first stage is the change in quasi-indexer ownership (ΔQuasi-indexer 
Ownership), which is calculated as the annual change in the fraction of shares held by quasi-indexer institutional 
investors in a firm, measured at the end of the first quarter after the reconstitution. The first two instruments for 
ΔQuasi-indexer Ownership are indicator variables equal to one if a stock switches from the Russell 1000 index to 
the Russell 2000 index (R1000 t-1 → R2000 t) or the Russell 2000 index to the Russell 1000 index (R2000 t-1 → 
R1000 t) at the annual Russell index reconstitution. The third instrument tracks the change in index rank from one 
year to another (Rank t  − Rank t-1). The regressions in the second stage include the fitted values of ΔQuasi-indexer 
Ownership as well as all the control variables included in the first-stage regressions. The dependent variable in 
the second stage is the annual change in abnormal net hiring (ΔAbnormal_Net_Hiring). The IV regressions focus 
only on switchers around the threshold. The first regression includes firms that, in a given year, switched by at 
most 200 ranks between the two Russell indexes, whereas the second regression focuses only on firms that 
switched by at most 100 ranks. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. In Panel A, we report the 
results using the same set of controls as in Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017). In Panel B, we also include the 
controls from our baseline specification (Eq. (6)) and the float adjusted market cap. End-of-May Market Cap is 
CRSP price (prc) multiplied by number of shares outstanding (shrout). Float Adjustment is the difference between 
the rank implied by the observed end-of-May CRSP market capitalization and the rank assigned by Russell in 
June (Crane et al., 2016). All the other variables are defined in Appendix A. F-statistic is the statistic from the F-
test of the joint significance of the instruments in the first-stage regressions. J-statistic (p-value) is the p-value 
from the Hansen (J) test of instrument overidentification. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A. Without original controls  





(at most 200 ranks) 
 
1st Stage           2nd Stage 
Switchers around 
the threshold 
(at most 100 ranks) 
 
1st Stage           2nd Stage 
     









R2000 t-1 → R1000 t    -0.015***  
(-3.13) 
 -0.021**  
(-2.54) 
 
Rank t  − Rank t-1    -0.002***  
(-7.11) 
 -0.002***  
(-7.08) 
 








































Original controls  No No No No 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  18,980 18,980 18,745 18,745 
F-statistic 21.45  23.22  
J-statistic (p-value) 0.16  0.31  
73 
 
Panel B. With original controls 





(at most 200 ranks) 
 
1st Stage           2nd Stage 
Switchers around 
the threshold 
(at most 100 ranks) 
 
1st Stage           2nd Stage 
     









R2000 t-1 → R1000 t    -0.016***  
(-3.10) 
 -0.021**  
(-2.42) 
 
Rank t  − Rank t-1    -0.001***  
(-4.60) 
 -0.001***  
(-4.57) 
 
















































Original controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  17,034 17,034 16,815 16,815 
F-statistic 12.41  12.56  





Table 11. The impact of short-term investors 
 
This table reports the results for the separate effects of short- and long-term ownership on abnormal net hiring. 
We present the results for the whole sample in Model 1. In Models 2 and 3, we present the results for the 
subsamples of over- and under-investing firms, respectively. In all models, we regress Abnormal_Net_Hiring on 
short-term ownership, long-term ownership, and the control variables. Short-term ownership is measured as the 
percentage of shares owned by transient institutional investors based on Bushee (1998). Long-term ownership is 
measured as the percentage of shares owned by dedicated and quasi-indexed institutional investors based on 
Bushee (1998). In Models 4 and 5, we examine the relation between short- and long-term ownership and under-
investment in labor for subsamples of firms with different probabilities of earnings manipulation. We proxy for 
the probability of earnings manipulation using the M-score (Beneish, 1999). For each year, we define firms with 
below- (above-) median M-score as likely (unlikely) manipulators. All regressions include year and industry fixed 
effects. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
   
Under-investment  



















      










      











Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  34,127 13,961 20,166 8,834 8,792 
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.11 
 
 
 
 
